

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

weapons, by their chemical names and by the toxicity of the chemicals, in metric tons (for example, chemical agent sarin -- 10 tonnes), and their stocks of chemical munitions by types and calibres and the number filled (for example, artillery munitions, 155 mm, filled with sarin -- 1,000 pieces).

We submit this proposal in the belief that it would largely resolve the entire problem of the declaration of stocks of chemical weapons and the declaration of the progress of their destruction at various stages of the process. In addition to the achievement of full agreement on the content of the initial declarations made after 30 days, it would open the way towards mutually acceptable agreements on the content of the general plans for the elimination of chemical weapons stocks which would be submitted by the States parties to the consultative committee, on the content of the periodic notifications concerning the implementation of these plans for the destruction of stocks, on the content of periodic notifications concerning each future stage of the implementation of such plans and on the content of the appropriate declarations after the completion of the process of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons.

Another question connected with chemical weapons stocks which has caused disagreement concerns the international verification of such stocks at the stage up to their elimination. Quite frequently, solutions have been proposed which could not be implemented in practice because they did not take into account a number of specific features connected with this question. In particular, it has been suggested that States parties to the future convention, after it enters into force, should declare the locations of declared stocks of chemical weapons, i.e. the storage places where they may be kept. Such a requirement is purely unilateral and unrealistic, since it does not take into account the possible general use of such places of storage, where chemical weapons are being kept, and might affect the defence interests of States not connected with chemical weapons.

After careful study of this question and some realistic proposals made in connection with it, the Soviet Union proposes that in order to ensure reliable verification of the declared stocks, provision should be made for the creation of store-houses at the specialized facilities for the destruction of these stocks, the location of which would be declared concurrently with the declaration of the destruction facilities mentioned above. At such places of storage, international verification on a "quota" basis would be permitted during the entire period of the destruction of the declared stocks.

Thus this question, too, could be considered to be resolved, with provision for the verification of the entire process of the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons, on the understanding, of course, that everyone will display a realistic approach to it.

At the current session of the Committee on Disarmament a great deal of attention has also been paid to the question of the direct verification of the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. In this connection we would like to state once again that we are no less interested than other States in reliable verification assuring our security and that of our allies. This applies