to be called (as it ought not to be) a necessary condition of thought and knowledge. Plato being judge—and our author will not dissent from Plato here—what is requisite to bring the question to an end, is, that some common characteristic of all cognition should be indicated. But we do not indicate any thing common to all cognition when we say that the law of contradiction is binding on reason universally. By the law of contradiction, the exercise of the Divine Intelligence is what it is. By the same law the exercise of the intelligence of a creature is what it is. Does this imply that the two are distinguished by any common characteristic ? Not at all. They may be essentially and in all respects different from each other, and yet each be what it is. The question, therefore, is not at an end, even though the universality and necessity of the law of contradiction be admitted. It will be at an end, when the knowledge of the Infinite Being, and that of finite beings like ourselves, have been designated by one notion ; and that there is any notion designative of both alike, remains yet to be evinced.

As a series of necessary propositions regarding knowledge could only be established on condition of a definition of knowledge being first given, so before a series of necessary propositions regarding existence can be established, it is indispensable that existence be de-fined. In some systems of philosophy, the identity of knowledge and existence, the equation of the known and the existent, is assumed. Were such an assumption legitimate no definition of existence over and above the definition of knowledge would require to be given; nor would an Ontology be any thing distinct from an Epis-temology. The task of the metaphysician would be ended, when he had worked out his theory of knowing; or at least, he would merely have to draw the inference, that, since knowledge and existence are coincident, real being consists in that (whatever it might be) which was proved to be the object of cognition—the object in this case being identical with the existence knowing. But Professor Ferrier does not allow us to assume that the known and the existent coincide. He finds fault with his great idol, Plato, for virtually mak-ing this assumption. "Here it was," he says, " that Plato broke down. Instead of proving the coincidence of the known and the existent, he assumed it." Now, if it be not legitimate to assume that knowledge is identical with existence, and to change our Epistemological conclusions at once into Ontological, then I repeat that just as a definition of knowledge is the conditio sine qua non of an Epistemology, so a separate and distinct definition of existence is the conditio sine qua non of an Ontology. Yet, strange to say, Pro-