

in order, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of those things wherein thou hast been instructed." (Luke 1. 3, 4.) What better assurance can we have of any fact than to "know the certainty" of it, which this Evangelist informs us can be enjoyed through written testimony. To know a thing morally, and to believe it with all the heart, are one and the same, as is clearly shewn by the foregoing quotations. Physical knowledge is common to all the animal creation, but *faith*, being the predominant principle of Christianity, takes man at a point where a brute can never ascend. Startling as the declaration may appear, yet it is a truth that cannot be controverted, that a majority of religionists have left the high dignity of their standing in the scale of being, and taken up with the principle of natural or physical knowledge which is common to all animals, as the basis of their assurance of pardon. "These speak evil of those things which they know not; but what they know naturally [or physically], as brute beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves." (Jude 10.) To illustrate this point I will refer to a fact that came under my observation not long since. A preacher in one of the self-styled Evangelical parties, was delivering to an audience what he called argument, to prove that a man could know his sins forgiven by his feelings, and that we were bound to believe a man when he testified to this fact, provided his word would be good in other matters. "Suppose," says he, "I would tell you I had the head-ache. You ask me how I know it? I answer, by my feelings. You are bound to take my testimony, as my word has never been impeached. Now on the same principle," continued he, "If I tell you that my sins are forgiven, and that I know it by my feelings, you are equally bound to believe me." This is one of the most palpable, as well as most current sophisms of this age, and every man should know how to meet it. The trick lies in the fact of no distinction being made between moral and physical testimony and their effects. We admit, when we are *sick, well, hungry, cold, sleepy, thirsty*, or what not of a physical character, we know it by our feelings, just as the brute knows the same things. Let one fact here be distinctly borne in mind, that a *proposition* and *testimony* must be homogeneous—of the same kind: that is, a physical proposition can never be sustained by moral testimony, and *vice versa*. For example, Suppose a man direct from Washington City, wishes to convince me that James K. Polk died, and was buried the first day of this month—that he stood by and witnessed his death, and followed him to his grave. Now this, to him, was a physical proposition (admitting it to be correct), for it came directly in contact with one of his senses. But to me it is a moral proposition, as it can only be made known to me by moral testimony—either verbal or written. Well, suppose the man undertakes to convince me of this fact, of which I know nothing, by a physical operation. Accordingly he falls to beating me and dragging me about the room. You perceive that I will know as little about the death of the President, as I did before. Why? Because the proposition and the testimony must be of the same kind. Well, again, he wishes to convince me that my head aches. This, to me, is a physical proposition. Now what say my feelings? Why, they testify emphatically that my head is entirely free from pain. But the man, in order to prove his position,