

2. I consider the 2nd, or Montreal District, as one of the most important of the frontier; and have comprised Kingston (and the intermediate country) within one district, because they should always be held in strict conjunction with each other, although exposed to various and different operations.

In this point of view I shall first notice the immediate frontier of Montreal, extending along our boundary line of 45°.

The left of this line of frontier is nearly bounded by the course of the Richelieu River, the outlet of Lake Champlain; and to show that I do not attach undue importance to its conservation, I take leave to submit the following extracts from official documents of the United States' Government.

The first is an extract from a document presented to Congress in their last Session, entitled a "*Report upon National Defences and National Boundaries*," dated 15th May, 1840.

In page 103, it is stated, "A work here (near the boundary line) on Lake Champlain, may be made to command the pass of the lake, and is considered by far the most important of any proposed in the whole line of frontier.

"The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar, while Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, stretch their whole length along the frontier, (forming, in fact, the boundary;) Champlain extends deeply into our territory, and while its southern extremity reaches almost to the Hudson, it finds its outlet to the north in the St. Lawrence, nearly midway between Montreal and Quebec, the two great objects of attack.

"This is, undoubtedly, the avenue by which the British possessions can be most effectually assailed; while, at the same time, it would afford to the enemy possessing a naval ascendancy equal facilities for bringing the war within our own borders, if it be left unfortified. It therefore becomes necessary to fortify a point as near the line as practicable, so as to shut out the enemy's vessels, and thus effect the double object of protecting the interior shores of the lake from the predatory attacks to which they would be otherwise exposed, and of securing it to ourselves as a channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown forward to the points of attack and defence."

The Officer at the head of the Engineer Department of the United States observes, in his *Report to the Secretary at War*,—

"From the northern end of this lake (Champlain) the forces of the United States should march into Canada, and interrupt the communication by the St. Lawrence, either at or near the mouth of the Richelieu River, at Montreal Island, at some point where the ship-channel of the river could be commanded intermediate between these places, or at any two, or at all of these places, according to circumstances.

"In the case of this offensive movement, the fortified position of Isle aux Noix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be left in the rear, being masked by suitable bodies of troops, and should be subjected to immediate and vigorous attack, so as to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal.

"The unexampled increase of population along our borders, the hundred new ways, already finished or in hand, of connecting these borders with the heart of the country, may so elevate the resources of this region, that, in the event of war, a resistless torrent will sweep the opposite territory from end to end. The military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lake Champlain are so obvious, that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly understood by our neighbours across the border."

Such are the opinions, and such, I may add, are the designs of our neighbours across the border.

The work proposed to close Lake Champlain against us, is among those submitted for the consideration of Congress. This list will be given hereafter in the course of this memorandum.

I will observe here, only, that in the opinion of all naval officers with whom I have communicated, we have no chance of getting an ascendancy upon Lake Champlain.

Every military consideration denotes Montreal as the primary object of an invading enemy. It is a position that severs the line of defensive operations, shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence, and restrains all below, while it withers all above; to gain possession of it, would imply the military possession of the Province.