

the probabilities of Bulgaria joining the Allies were never so strong as they are now. It may easily be one of that series of spectacular events that will bring the war to a close. Bulgaria may be able to strike a few shrewd blows here and there, but she must know well that her position is absolutely hopeless, that she has not the chance of the proverbial snowball in Hades. The war has never been popular among the Bulgarians, who have not even yet realized that they are fighting on the side of the Turks and against the Russians. It would be a great triumph for Russian diplomacy if she could produce a state of concord between Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro and weld them into a Balkan Slav federation. It is almost certain that she has been trying to do so. It is likely that she has been holding back Roumania in that hope, and it is also likely that she now looks to Roumanian intervention as the final demonstration to Bulgaria as well as to Hungary of the hopelessness of their position. It is therefore well to bear in mind that there may be more in the present situation than the addition of a new nation and a new army, that it may be another turn of the screw to force both Bulgaria and Hungary to ask for terms that would not be onerous, and that might even give to Bulgaria a place in that Slav union that lies always near to the heart of Russian diplomacy.

SOME such theory as this would go far to account for the curious situation now in Greece and the delay in the Allied advance that seemed to have begun seriously some two weeks ago. The delay may be caused by unreadiness, which seems unlikely; it may be due to the expectation of Roumanian help and the desire for a concerted advance; or we may find the reason in an unwillingness to press Bulgaria too hard at some critical diplomatic moment. But in the meantime when we hear of Bulgarian successes, and of the capture by Bulgarians of various towns it is well to value the news by a glance at the map. The Allied line runs in a rough semicircle from Florina to Seres, a distance of about 150 miles. The left wing at Florina was held by the Serbians and these were ordered to fall back after a brief resistance, and they did so, leaving Florina and Banitsa in Bulgarian hands. But all the other Bulgarian successes were not against the Allies at all, but against the Greeks, with the exception of an outpost fight at Seres. The Bulgarians came from the northeast and moved against Kavala, which is to the east of the extremity of the Allied right wing. The Greek troops were instructed not to resist, and were assured that whatever territory was occupied by the Bulgarians would be restored. None the less the Greek forces did resist and so defied the king, and it is evident that they have the support of the people behind them. The situation is still chaotic, but at the moment of writing it seems as though Greece were actually at war with Bulgaria. The Allied forces proper have been in contact with the Bulgarians only at Doiran at the northernmost arc of the semicircle, and here the Allies seem to have been successful. Assuming that some sort of negotiations with Bulgaria are now going on and that those negotiations

will fail, then it is evident that the Allies intend to press northward up the Vardar River toward Uskub, with a view to cutting the international railroad. But it is to be remembered that this would have no immediate effect against Austria except a moral one, and that the main objective of the war in the east is now to crush Austria. At the same time the cutting of the international railroad would have a profoundly depressing effect in Germany, and the state of the public mind is quite as important a factor as the victories and defeats of armies. The greatest possible Allied triumph would be the peaceful detachment of Bulgaria. It might easily mean the end of the war.

THE Russians have either been held recently or they have been crouching for another spring. The probabilities are that they have been held and that Von Hindenburg's strategy has been bearing fruit. For the war south of the Pripet Marsh is not wholly a matter of hard hitting. Russia is somewhat in the position of a fighter who tries to overcome his opponent by rushing at him with outstretched arms in the hope to envelop him. One of those arms is represented by the forces that are attacking Kovel. The other arm is creeping west along the foothills of the Carpathians. The Austrian armies are almost within the circle of those arms, and Von Hindenburg's first care must be to extricate them before they close. He must not only withdraw those armies in the best shape possible until some defensible line can be found, but he must also check the movements of the arms themselves, either by direct resistance or by some counter threat. He seems to be doing both. On the Stokhod River he is fiercely resisting the encircling advance of the northern arm, but there is another danger in the south that Brusiloff is evidently doing his best to ward off. It is evident that as the Russian forces are advancing westward along the line of the Carpathians they are exposing themselves to a damaging attack from the south and through the Carpathian passes from Hungary. It was an attack of this same kind, but from the west instead of the south, that compelled the Grand Duke to withdraw in such precipitate haste from Hungary. Now we do not know what forces the Germans might be able to bring from Hungary in order to cut the lengthening Russian line that is creeping westward. But the Russians are evidently aware of the possibility of such an attempt, and this accounts for the desperate fighting to control the passes. It is of no use for the wrestler to enfold his opponent if he leaves himself open to a paralyzing blow on the elbow. The Russians can not proceed indefinitely along the line of the Carpathians without guarding themselves against an attack from the south. But if they can seize the passes and fortify them they will then be secure. And this must be done before their westward-moving Carpathian line becomes too long and attenuated. And unless it can be done quickly the Austrian armies in the centre will find the new and defensible line for which they are looking, and probably it will be in front of Lemberg. The aim of Von Hindenburg is then to hold back the encircling arms north and south, at Kovel and the

Carpathians, until their prey shall have escaped. And the present indications are that he is succeeding in doing this. But if he does no more than this it will be a negative victory. It will be the avoidance of one more crushing disaster. But if he can break the Russian line along the Carpathians it will be a definite and unquestionable success.

And here we see the vital bearing of Roumanian intervention upon the Russian campaign. Roumania not only threatens Bulgaria on the south, but she threatens also Hungary on the north and west. With that threat an imminent one she is acting as a shield to the Russian armies north of the Carpathians. She is likely effectually to prevent the sending of Teuton forces northward through the passes. If there were sufficient German forces in Hungary they could guard against a Roumanian invasion and still strike northward through the Carpathians upon the Russian flank. But we know that there are no such Teuton forces in Hungary nor are there forces elsewhere that can be sent there. Even before the action of Roumania there was not a single Teuton front anywhere that was not badly in need of reinforcements. And now comes a new army of nearly a million men, opening up two completely new fronts, nearly seven hundred miles in length, and exercising a powerful bearing upon two of the already existing fronts in Bulgaria and Russia. The possibilities are so colossal as to stagger the imagination.

ROUMANIA'S plan of campaign is yet uncertain. The bulletins speak of an incursion into Transylvania, and it is to be noted that nearly all the authoritative commentators, such as Take Jonescu, of Roumania, and Gabriele Hanotaux, of France, speak of Transylvania as among the Roumanian prizes of war. It is significant that there should be such unanimity of statement. It looks almost like a warning to Hungary that she is at the eleventh hour of her fate and that she must pay the Roumanian bill if it once reaches the point of presentation. But it may be repeated that the factor of greatest moment is the road that has now been opened for a Russian advance into the Balkans. We need no longer compare the forces of France and England now in Greece with those of Bulgaria. Such calculations are swamped and made of no moment by the sudden disappearance of the dam which until now has held back the Russian flood. For many months Russia has been massing her men at the northern tip of Roumania to the east of Czernowitz. Steady streams of munitions have been pouring into Roumania from Russia, and those streams have become very much larger since the opening of Archangel. It is hard to resist the conviction that the group of events that we have just witnessed, the declaration of war by Italy against Germany, the sending of Italian troops to the Balkans, the intervention of Roumania, are the deliberated and foreseen moves in the great game of diplomacy, all of them directed toward the elimination of Austria and each of them played successively and with cumulative force. But at least one thing seems certain. Bulgaria must make peace at once or be exterminated. Probably she can still save herself, but she must be quick.

## STILL ANOTHER WAR PROPHECY

By THE MONOCLE MAN

HARD-HEADED Hindenburg, watching the defeat of the flower of the German army on the Somme, was a significant figure which will loom large and lowering across the film of history. It may not be painted—for it is a figure typifying defeat. Yet, again, it may be painted by artists of nations yet unborn, as the centre of a grim and tragic scene in the Great War—much as we paint Brutus at Philippi. If we could photograph the brain of a man in action, and throw the picture on a screen, we might have, in our photograph of the mental processes of Hindenburg on the Somme, an actual portrayal of the turning point in the war. For it is quite possible that, as Hindenburg saw his Prussians, Bavarians and Saxons—and brave Brandenburgers—hurled back by the irresistible poitons of France and the dogged British "Tommies," he came, right at that time and place, to his final decision to abandon the war on the Western front and seek victory—or defeat—in the East.

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HINDENBURG is an Eastern front man. He was a specialist on the Mazurian Lake region before he retired to his Hanoverian beer garden. He was not called out of his retirement at the opening of the war—the Kaiser did not think he would need him. But when the gallant Russians hurled an army

into East Prussia before it was dreamed they could be ready to fight at all, for the purpose of relieving the pressure on Paris, the Kaiser remembered Hindenburg and his "fad" for Mazurian Lake strategy, and summoned him to take command in that district. There Hindenburg won his renown. And the remarkable thing is that he has kept it. Mackensen did work during his sweep across Galicia and Poland which should have eclipsed "the lion of the north"; but it did not. Again, it was Mackensen who ploughed up plucky Serbia, Hindenburg remaining idle on the Dwina. Still Hindenburg retained his place as the German hero of the war. And when the Kaiser once more found himself in a tight place, being caught by the sudden irruption of Roumania into the fighting, he sent for—not Mackensen—but Hindenburg, and made him ruler over all his armies.

The selection of von Hindenburg to replace Falkenhayn was a magnificent choice. Hindenburg stands for the importance of the Eastern front. He would never have attacked Verdun. It is not likely that he believes either that France can be worn out or that Britain can be cowed. He would—if acting wholly on his own judgment—transfer the weight of the German armies to the East, and finish the war there

—if possible. Everybody knew this when he was chosen as Generalissimo. A new danger had arisen in the East and the Kaiser sent for an Eastern man—just as he sent for a Mazurian Lake man to meet a danger amidst the Mazurian Lakes. But the great and significant difference between the two cases was that the Mazurian Lake man was given command of only the Mazurian Lake army, while the Eastern front man was given command of the entire German forces.

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THIS probably means that Hindenburg will use the whole German army to meet the new Eastern danger. He probably intended to do so when appointed. But recent events on the Somme and the Meuse will have strengthened this resolve. That is why his tall and striking figure, watching the Allied rush toward Combes, meant so much. He may then have said to himself: "It is of no use. We can not hold them here. We had better sell them what they want until we reach a line we dare not abandon—say, the line of the Meuse—a line which we can hold with a million fewer men. Then I can throw my released million into the real battlefield of this war, the East." Joffre calculated lately that the Germans had two millions and a half on the Western front, and only one million and a hundred and fifty