

the office of the prime minister. For other purposes special envoys were sent, as when Mr. Fielding negotiated trade relations in France and in the United States, or Mr. Lemieux arranged a compromise with the Government of Japan upon the immigration issue. In these cases the British ambassador was nominally associated with the Canadian envoy. Even this formal limitation was lacking in the case of the conventions effected with France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Italy in 1900-1910, by negotiation with their consuls in Ottawa. Finally in the waterways treaty with the United States, the international status of Canada was for the first time formally recognized in the provision that the decision to submit to arbitration matters other than those regarding boundary waters should be made on the one hand by the president and Senate of the United States, and on the other by the governor-general-in-council, the Cabinet of the Dominion.

"At the close of the Laurier period, then, every phase of our foreign relations so far as they concerned the United States, and an increasingly large share of our foreign relations with other powers, were under Canadian control. It remained true, however, that Canada had no voice in determining peace and war. In other words, it was with Britain's neighbors, rather than with Canada's neighbors, that any serious war was most likely to come. Diplomatic policy and the momentous issue of peace or war in Europe or Asia were determined by the British Cabinet. In this field alone equality was as yet to seek. The consistent upholder of Dominion autonomy contended that here, too, power and responsibility would come in the same measure as military and naval preparation and participation in British wars. Just as Canada secured a voice in her foreign commercial relations as soon as her trade interests and industrial development gave her commercial weight, so a share in the last word of diplomacy might be expected to come almost automatically as Dominion and Commonwealth (Australia) built up military and naval forces, or took part in overseas wars." (pp. 286-288.)

Mr. Skelton warmly approves the Australian and Laurier plan of dominion navies. As Laurier built up the Canadian militia, spending on it in 1911 over six times as much as in 1890, and asserted the complete Canadian control of it, so he tried to establish a Canadian navy to parallel that of Australia, but was somewhat ahead of his time in this country, certainly ahead of opinion in his own province as exploited in 1911 by Sir Robert Borden and his friends. He made a nation of this Dominion, as far as he could in the time allotted him, and at the same time made it a more vital and integral part of the Empire. He fell from power for a time in 1911 because he was too true a Canadian and too British for the Borden-Bourassa combination.

THE LIFE OF SIR WILFRID LAURIER--7

The commanding part played by Laurier in the enhancement of Canada's national dignity has involved the greatest possible contribution to the political cementing of the British Race and to the realization of a practical and original imperialism. The British Empire of the present and future as Laurier has built it from the Canadian side, is no resuscitation of an antiquated centralization, but the logical development of Great Britain's wise instinct in leaving the colonies to govern themselves. Mr. Skelton says: "Alike in the motherland and in the colonies men had stumbled upon the secret of empire—freedom. Expecting the end to come soon, the governing powers in London had ruled with a light rein, consenting to one colonial demand after another for self-governing. In these years of salutary neglect the two-fold roots of imperial connection had a chance to grow. The colonies rose to national consciousness and yet in very truth because of their freedom and the absence of the friction a centralizing policy would have entailed they retained their affection and their sympathy for the land of