

*Adjournment Debate*

when you look at the options in that document. First of all, on page 2 of the document the problem is set out. The first subparagraph reads:

- (i) because U.S. interests are using Canada's present neutral position to increase support for TAPS,
- (ii) because there is a wide spectrum of opinion in Canada regarding the advantages and disadvantages of an alternative route through Canada, and
- (iii) because there is little time left for Canada to influence the choice of route instead of having to respond to a U.S. initiative.

The question is: Did Canada try to influence the choice of route? And the answer is clearly no. The evidence is further found in this document to which I have referred. If one looks at page 4, paragraph 11 of that document, the fact is that on March 24 1971, the hon. J. J. Greene and the hon. Jean Chrétien met with the presidents of oil companies interested in the TAPS line. They made it clear they were not going to apply to Canada to build an oil line across Canada. This was also made clear at the briefing for parliamentarians who went to Washington in July to make one last-ditch stand on the matter.

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Further on page 6 it is again made clear why the government did not want to interfere, because in paragraph 17 on that page it is stated:

A pipe line route will traverse lands covered by Indian Treaties 8 and 11. Specific provisions relative to the land entitlement aspects of these treaties have never been fulfilled—

This is a clear admission by the Canadian government that the provisions of these treaties have not been fulfilled. Then we look at the alternatives. Again on page 6 of that document we find:

These alternatives range from the present essentially passive role—of awaiting any application that might be made and doing nothing more than to continue technical discussions with representatives of the U.S. oil companies on the possible construction of a pipeline through Canada—to a very active role of seeking an application and offering special incentives to encourage it.

The Canadian government knew the difficulty we were in, because in paragraph 25 on page 8 we read these words:

Recent reports in the U.S. press attribute statements by U.S. government and oil industry officials to the effect that they had written off a Canadian route as an alternative to a trans-Alaska route because of lack of Canadian interest in a trans-Canadian oil pipeline.

Then we see three options set out. The first is:

Maintain the present position which involves no active encouragement of a pipeline—

Paragraph (a) concludes:

Conversely, this alternative would not escalate the native claims issue.

Then there is paragraph (b) which literally says the same thing, but this is the pretend or pretence paragraph. It says we should pretend we are interested. It says we should pretend to keep our options open by saying we will consider all options. Then there is paragraph (c), where we read:

Take a position of actively promoting the use of a Canadian route... This option could reduce Canada's bargaining position relative to a natural gas pipeline from Alaska, as well as the oil pipeline, and in general bring on the disadvantages of being too

[Mr. Fraser.]

aggressive... This option could also be expected to escalate the native claims issue.

It is quite clear that as long ago as 1971 the government had no intention to try to use any influence it had to keep tankers off the west coast. It did not want to deal with native Indian claims and it did not want to reduce its bargaining position with respect to a natural gas pipeline, which is all it was interested in.

In June, the United States gave us one last chance. We gave them our answer one day before the U.S. Senate was to vote on the issue. The history of this matter makes us look incredible to the United States. The present so-called Canadian policy of supplying Canadian oil to Cherry Point to get rid of tankers, as stated by the Prime Minister on September 11, is ludicrous if we are to have the pipeline to Montreal, as just announced by the government, because we will not have any oil to sell to the United States.

This is the policy that the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) is taking to Mr. Kissinger on Tuesday next. The laughter in Washington will be so loud that the Secretary of State for External Affairs will not get a word in edgewise and, tragically for Canada, it will serve him right because he really does not have anything to say. It is all a wretched charade. It is the dismal and inevitable result of deception and incompetence over the last three years.

**Mr. Joseph-Philippe Guay (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Transport):** Mr. Speaker, contrary to what the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Fraser) has mentioned—because it is quite easy for a member of the opposition to make a lot of statements in a case like this—the Canadian government is concerned about the risk to the environment entailed in the passage of supertankers through the Strait of Juan de Fuca to Puget Sound. This has been made abundantly clear on a number of occasions over the past two years or more in communications to the United States government, both written and verbal, including communications by ministers to their counterparts, and also in a number of public statements.

Canada would have preferred an overland pipeline route through this country. However, in view of current action by the U.S. Congress it is now likely that the trans-Alaska pipeline, with its Maritime link, will be constructed. When the final legal impediments are lifted, probably some time this year, it will of course be some years yet before the oil actually begins to flow.

Canada cannot prevent the construction of the Alaska pipeline since it is entirely within United States territory. We also know that most of the oil produced in Alaska will be shipped to various ports on the U.S. west coast by very large vessels travelling well out to sea. Provided these vessels are constructed and managed in accordance with the highest safety standards—and the United States has a good record in this regard—there is no reason why Canada should be unduly concerned about this high seas traffic.

Our most serious concern is with those tankers which will enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca to supply the refineries in Puget Sound. Canada is unable unilaterally to stop this traffic. We must therefore seek to influence the United States either to supply these refineries by some