

There was a further difficulty which gave those of us who were concerned with the negotiation of the Treaty much concern. We knew that our governments did not have aggressive or provocative policies; that they believed sincerely and firmly in the principles of the United Nations Charter and were anxious to strengthen the organization in which those principles were embodied. We felt that our record at its meetings was the best proof of our support for the United Nations. Nevertheless, we knew also, of course, that those communist governments who by omission and commission had shown their contempt for the Charter and for international cooperation under it, would misrepresent our support for the Atlantic Pact as a deliberate effort on our part to sabotage the United Nations. We attempted to meet this charge by carefully reserving in our Pact all our obligations and rights under the Charter. We also deliberately and specifically subordinated our Pact to the Charter, and we negotiated it under Article 51 of that Charter. I know, of course, that nothing we could do would prevent vicious and malicious misrepresentation by the communists. We had to expect that. We were more worried, however, by the suggestion from more sincere and respectable quarters that, in some way, those who advocated the Atlantic Pact were being disloyal to the United Nations. Of course, it may be argued - as it has been argued - that Article 51 was never intended to shelter a collective security arrangement such as our Pact. It can also be argued, however, and I think with greater force, that Article 51 was never intended to prevent nations working out such defensive collective arrangements after it had been sufficiently demonstrated that the Security Council was being paralysed for this purpose by the policy of one of its permanent members.

The argument, however, is a barren one. The Atlantic democracies are satisfied that their record at Lake Success is sufficient proof of their resolve not to allow the Atlantic Pact to interfere with their obligations or their rights under the Charter.

The heart of the Atlantic Pact is found in Article 5. Under this Article the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more signatories in Europe or North America shall be regarded as an attack against them all; and they undertake to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area in the event of such an attack. The nature and extent of the action required to discharge this obligation, which may include the use of armed force, is left to each participant to determine. Any measures taken, however, shall terminate as soon as the Security Council has taken effective action.

One aspect of the Treaty which is of great interest is the question of action in the event of indirect aggression. The problem of defining for treaty purposes this insidious technique is so complex and full of pitfalls that an attempt to do so might well confuse rather than clarify matters. Furthermore, a specific commitment to deal with indirect aggression along the lines of the commitment undertaken in Article 5 would not be acceptable to most countries in present circumstances. Yet the danger from this kind of aggression is a very real one. Indeed it may well be that we will not again experience that type of direct armed aggression with which we have become so familiar. Some cynic has said that generals are always preparing to win the last war. Diplomats should be careful not to concentrate on preventing the last war, by making the test of aggression an unreal and antiquated one.

Hitler, for instance, was almost a primitive practitioner of indirect aggression in comparison with present day standards. Nevertheless the evidence of the Nuremberg trials indicates the degree of deception of which this technique was capable even at that rudimentary stage of its development. The carefully planned seizure of

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