

USSR withdrawals (5,000 and 11,500 men respectively) to be followed after one year by a three year cap on forces remaining. Information would be exchanged about the numbers present and this would be subject to on-site verification. Thus the "data dispute," as it is known in MBFR jargon, would be on the shelf, so to speak, for the first year and in the ensuing three years it would only reemerge if Western inspectors found evidence — or believed they found evidence — of Eastern duplicity in the figures they provided. The reverse — Eastern complaints of Western duplicity — is unlikely to happen largely because Western figures have not been seriously disputed in the past by Eastern negotiators.

There are also differences as to whether armaments reductions, which are called for in the agreed mandate, should be negotiated as part of a first agreement or set aside for treatment later. The East contends that the issue should be settled; the West states that, given the geographical problem of the comparative remoteness of the US, it should be left to each side to determine what it wishes to do with the armaments of forces withdrawn.

Nor is there agreement that common ceilings be flexible enough to allow additional United States troops to be present temporarily in Europe for short-term military exercises. (Canadian and British troops would be eligible as well.) The East insists that ceilings must be rigidly observed at all times.

While there is still some distance to go before overall agreement can be reached, both sides find the process of negotiation valuable in itself. Talking about these issues provides an opportunity for the representatives of the governments involved to gain an understanding of the motivations and objectives of all participants. Such a dialogue is essential in the increasingly complex world of conventional forces and armaments.

If agreement is reached, the Canadian Forces in Europe will be affected. Although their small size will exempt them from taking a significant share of reductions, they will be a part of NATO's collective limitation and they will therefore be subject to inspection by the East. Furthermore, Canadians will participate in the administration of any overall regime that finally caps the sizes of forces allowed in this heavily militarized area of the world.

CSCE

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was negotiated over a two year period culminating in a summit conference at Helsinki where 35 heads of government signed the document in August 1975. The process goes on in the form of overall review and other

meetings to discuss particular subjects within the basic document.

The first chapter of the Helsinki Final Act contains ten principles which are to guide relations among the participating states. Two of these principles reflect the central preoccupations of East and West. For the East, the third principle states in part that the signatories "regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers and . . . will refrain from assaulting these frontiers." This quasi-recognition of post-war boundaries is balanced to a degree by a sentence in another principle which accepts the notion that frontiers can be changed by peaceful means. For the West, the seventh principle spells out human rights in some detail and in various ways commits states to respect them. This principle, too, is balanced by another which stipulates that signatories will refrain from intervention in one another's internal affairs.

The second chapter lays out ground rules for cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. It covers commercial exchanges, industrial cooperation, trade, science and technology, transport, tourism and many other topics. This is followed by a brief declaration relating to the Mediterranean area. The third and last main chapter contains provisions regarding cooperation in humanitarian fields, including human contacts, which has within it a section important for many Canadians on the reunification of families. Chapter three also has sections on information, culture and education.

The document concludes with a brief fourth section providing for further meetings. Two major meetings to review implementation of all aspects of the Final Act have been held so far, one in Belgrade in 1977 and one in Madrid which ran from 1980 to 1983. A third is scheduled to be held in Vienna beginning in November 1986. A number of more specialized meetings have also been held on such matters as peaceful settlement of disputes, science, and various other matters. One of these was held in Ottawa in June of 1985 on the subject of human rights.

Like MBFR, the working sessions of all CSCE meetings are closed to the public under the agreed rules of procedure, but individual delegations are much more liberal in keeping the media and interested groups informed about developments.

As regards arms control, the first chapter of the Final Act contains a section setting out certain confidence building measures, or CBMs. In the words of a 1981 United Nations report on the subject, CBMs "aim at strengthening international peace and security and at fostering a climate of trust and international cooperation among States to facilitate progress in the disarmament field." The Final Act of the CSCE provides for two degrees of obligation,