

and has borrowed a number of Western ideas, practices and solutions that can be applied to both international and domestic problems. He has eliminated from Soviet diplomatic discourse the notion of an enduring enmity between the two systems. It appears that Eastern Europe is no longer considered to be essential to security in the Soviet Union. At the same time Gorbachev has firmly ruled out territorial change and any Western advocacy of such change will undoubtedly evoke an increasing emphasis on the theme of "German revanchism". While he may be motivated primarily by the need for time to reconstruct Soviet society there is little reason to doubt that "new thinking" is also based on a tactical revision of Soviet assumptions about the place of military power in providing for Soviet security. His strong reliance now on "preventive diplomacy" seems to be in line with this changed approach.

As they understand the fundamental assumptions of Marxism-Leninism and the urgency of bringing its doctrines in line with present realities, Gorbachev and his colleagues believe that "socialism" is the best way to organize society and that in the end this view will come to be accepted by others. They are likely to resist attempts, from both within and without, to substitute a Western or "capitalist" view of how democracy should work. But they are no longer prepared to make ideology an issue in the USSR's relations with other states.

If "communism" is no longer a major issue in East-West relations, the issue of "human rights" may take its place as an obstacle to ending the "Cold War". While Soviet practice in this respect has much improved, dissent within the Soviet Union that takes the form of separatism (for example, in the Baltic Republics), and growing ethnic tensions elsewhere, could lead to coercion and outright repression. There is little possibility of a reversion to full-scale Stalinism, but any reversal of democratization and of economic reform could encourage those in the West who oppose normal relations with the USSR to proclaim the failure of the Gorbachev experiment and the futility of the Helsinki process. In the face of the formidable problems that the nationalities question will probably present over the coming years, the Soviet leadership will need to observe unusual restraint and imagination. Gorbachev looks to Western governments for a similar exercise