

demonstrate how embassies in foreign countries can be used to do research and to influence not only foreign governments, but also their citizens. The exertion of such influence (within the limits of the law and decorum of the host countries, of course) is accepted practice in international affairs.

On the basis of the kind of diplomacy suggested above, Canada might pursue two strategies in particular toward building an international consensus for a common security world order.

1. Negotiation of declarations by other countries for support *in principle* for a common security world order based on enforceable world law.

In diplomacy, when a final agreement on a subject seems too remote, it is common practice to seek agreements on general principles. An excellent example of such an agreement is the McCloy-Zorin Accord, which in 1961 set out the general principles on which an eventual disarmament agreement might be based (Appendix 3-1). This accord was later adopted by the U.N. and subsequently written into the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament. It expressly acknowledges that disarmament will ultimately require an international security regime for inspection and enforcement. The attempt to seek common security accords could proceed logically from such previous agreements.

If at this time actual negotiation of the structures of world federation and enforceable world law is too remote, we suggest Canada and like-minded states pursue agreements with other states, particularly the superpowers, that world federation is *in principle* the direction in which we would like the world to go. And if we cannot achieve agreements in principle for a fully-mature world federation, with a world parliament elected democratically by the citizens of all countries, then we can pursue agreements toward an intermediate model of world federation--a federal assembly of governments of the sort implied by the Binding Triad, which we discuss in section 3-C of the brief.

The pursuit of agreements of principle would be a consensus-building, consciousness-changing process in that it would engage diplomats of other countries in serious discussion based on an alternative set of assumptions. Any agreements achieved would, of course, represent real progress toward the day when a U.N. charter review conference becomes feasible. Indeed, such agreements could eventually *make* such a conference feasible.

Canada can work bilaterally in the pursuit of such agreements as well as through existing multilateral forums. But Canada must also pursue the creation of new forums in which negotiations can take place. This paper makes recommendations about existing forums, specifically the Stockholm Conference, and the Special Committee on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization; as well as recommendations about new forums, specifically a U.N. Continuing Conference on World Security.

2) Formation of international alliances of states prepared to take all possible immediate action on behalf of common security principles.

A world of common security does not have to wait for every state to be ready to go all the way to world federation. Early progress may be made through regional and other alliances of states agreeing to manage their own relationships within a common security framework. This is the principle behind the Peacemakers Association of Nations concept, which world federalists have promoted. (Appendix 3-2)