

might well be retrogression in human development. Indeed, a Nazi Europe loomed as real possibility. Right in the preface to his first book he had written "... one need not admit ... any ineluctable determinism in the affairs of men and states." Barros has no authority for claiming that: "Norman believed in the great march of history ... No matter what he did, no matter how illegal it was, it could be justified ideologically and psychologically. The laws of communism's dilectical materialism were higher than those governing Canada, higher than any secrecy oath, and greater than thoughts of national security." (184) Those lines are so foreign to Norman's character and recorded thought that they constitute libel. Norman had a well-developed sense of right and wrong, good and evil. The author of No Sense of Evil might reflect on King Gordon's magnificent report on Norman's state of mind two days before the suicide. Norman had spoken of the Senate investigation as "evil, as if it were an incarnate thing ... as capable of destroying life, of destroying the world." And when he had earlier heard of the death of the Chairman of the Subcommittee, he permitted himself the rare luxury of a harsh quip: "Where there is death there is hope."

Speaking of evil, ponder Barros' response to Joe Clark's cool rejection of his demand, conveyed by Dr. Alex Kindy, M.P., for an explanation of why he was protecting "a former mole of the Soviet KGB." Clark replied: "it would be unnecessary and unworthy to raise 30-year-old questions here in the House." Barros shot back, in the second edition of his book: "... even after forty years, the government, rightly, has no compunction to bring up the issue of war crimes committed elsewhere. Is espionage against Canada a less serious crime?" (221)

Some lighter, lesser items: why does Barros always dignify Robert Morris, the Chief Counsel to the Senate subcommittee that hounded Norman, with the title "Judge"? Morris, it is true, had served as a local magistrate but all the journalists, other authors, and colleagues address him simply as "Robert Morris" or "Bob". Is Barros seeking to camouflage the fact that Morris' conduct was the very opposite of judicial? And why does he so often refer to the "King of Canada" when everyone I know would just say "Canada"? Could he be teasing? And surely he cannot be serious about the suggestion that Washington might well have given Pearson "misleading information" "in the hope that he would convey it to Moscow." "Regrettably," he adds, "the theory cannot be tested at present." (216)

Perhaps he isn't kidding. As diplomatic historian Michael Fry has shown (International Perspectives March/April 1989), Barros has not the slightest understanding of Canada's.