

filtering process and definition of common ground (1985), to negotiation and agreement (1986). It is also possible to identify political impulses at key points in the conference which were necessary to ensure progress. Some may question why it took so long to reach agreement. The answer lies in the fact that Europe remains the focal point of East-West security concerns affecting intra-European relations, relations between superpowers in Europe, and relations between the superpowers and Europe. It would not have been possible to accelerate progress until the process matured without running the risk of stalemate, or settling for a mini-package of non-binding Helsinki-type CBMs.

DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Five separate proposals on CSBMs were advanced during the first year of negotiations at Stockholm: by NATO, Romania, the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states, the Soviet Union and Malta.¹⁵ The proposals were expected to meet the criteria of the conference mandate agreed at Madrid. CSBMs, to be agreed, would be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification."¹⁶

A major difference between the East and West during the negotiations was the interpretation of the mandate. Based on a well documented Madrid negotiating record, the West, supported by some NNA, maintained that the so-called "functional approach" provided for the notification of **only** those military activities in the adjoining sea area and air space that were functionally linked with notifiable activities on land. In other words, both criteria called for by the mandate would have to be met: activities affecting security in Europe, as well as constituting a part of such activities taking place in Europe.¹⁷ The East argued for the "geographical approach" maintaining only one criterion was necessary: all activities including independent air and naval activities that affected European security in any way were subject to notification. Acceptance of the "geographic approach" would have extended the zone of application beyond Europe.

While the West expected that the proposals submitted at the beginning of the conference by different states or groups of states to differ in degree, those suggested by the USSR differed both in degree and in kind, and for the most part represented a radical departure from the mandate. The Soviets focussed on broad political declaratory measures which, they argued, would ensure peaceful military behaviour. Their proposal repeated the WTO January 1983 Prague Declaration which called for measures con-

cerning: non-first use of nuclear weapons; a treaty on non-use of force and maintenance of peaceful relations; curtailment of military budgets and expenditures; ridding Europe of chemical weapons and non-stationing of chemical weapons where there were none before; and nuclear weapon-free zones. Such proposals were neither militarily effective nor verifiable and most were already under consideration elsewhere. Only the last section addressed military CSBMs and called for elaboration of Helsinki Final Act measures as well as limitations on ground force military manoeuvres.

The proposals of the West and the NNA were more in concert with the mandate and emphasized the adoption of militarily effective measures that would help to make military activity more transparent and predictable. The West proposed CSBMs on: exchange of military information; exchange of annual forecasts of activities notifiable in advance; notification of military activities 45 days in advance; observation of certain military activities; compliance and verification; and development of means of communications. The NNA put forward 12 measures: prior notification of major military manoeuvres; prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres; prior notification of military manoeuvres involving amphibious, sea-transported, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations thereof; prior notification of major military movements; prior notification of major military activities; invitation of observers to military manoeuvres and movements; prior notification of redeployment of major military units; notification of certain other major military activities; exchange of annual calendars of pre-planned major military activities; ceiling for forces engaged in a major military manoeuvre; ceiling for amphibious, air-borne, air-mobile forces engaged in military manoeuvres; and constraints on the deployment of forces in areas to be determined with capability for sustained offensive operations. The West maintained that adoption of militarily effective measures would be an indication of political willingness on the part of participant states to pursue peaceful relations. The NNA proposals were politically important because they largely conformed to the mandate and helped to define the 'centre of gravity' of the conference.

During the first year of the negotiations the only common ground that was identifiable was the apparent willingness of all participants to elaborate further the Helsinki CBMs, (prior notification of military manoeuvres, movements and transfers and observation), a far cry from "new, effective and concrete actions" called for by the mandate.

INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS

Stockholm ebbed and flowed in response to political events which influenced East-West relations, from the

* "In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."