

dubious logic that "we have never found anything that the Soviets successfully hid." Behind these disputes, however, is a fundamental dilemma for freeze proponents: if a comprehensive freeze were declared, and if suspicion and recrimination began to mount about alleged violations, would the freeze have produced more or less stability?

In sum, as the freeze debate continued, one issue became increasingly clear: a comprehensive freeze would not or could not be implemented by joint or coincidental declaration. As the implications of this became obvious, individuals who were otherwise sympathetic to the substance and the intent began to modify their position. The late Herbert Scoville, then president of the Washington-based Arms Control Association summarized the point:

"Arrangements for stopping in a single agreement all nuclear weapons programs, including delivery vehicles would be very complicated and almost certainly take so long to negotiate that the arms race would have gotten still further out of control before such a total freeze could, if ever, be put into effect. However, it should be possible to select certain programs for priority effort giving due attention to how easily they can be defined, how well they can be verified, and how critical it is to stop them quickly."

In suggesting that the solution to the problems of the comprehensive freeze was to select the parts which were amenable to quick freezing, the Scoville comment points to an increasing number of arms control supporters who, intentionally or otherwise, have tried to absorb the comprehensive freeze proposal into traditional arms control approaches. Ironically, these are precisely the approaches from which the freeze proposal was intended to break away. Nevertheless, selective or partial freezes have begun to command more attention than the comprehensive approach, even though highly selective freezes, such as a ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons, a ban on maneuverable re-entry vehicles, on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles have to date proved no more conducive to negotiation than the comprehensive freeze itself. Even if one or two were to be successful, however, they would hardly constitute the blow to the arms race that the *Call to Halt the Arms Race* had sought.

CONCLUSIONS

The comprehensive freeze proposals presented at the UN and adopted by overwhelming majorities, despite the opposition of the United States and its

major allies, are unlikely to be implemented in their present form. What should be drawn from this experience?

First, there are no easy steps that can halt the arms race. In the case of the freeze, a combination of technical and political intricacy has gradually eroded the freshness of the proposal, however much it may still be a long-term objective.

Second, if only in defeat, the freeze movement demonstrated the power of the political process, suggesting that sustained pressure based on popular support can force arms control issues onto the political agenda.

Third, if public interest and pressure require a compelling focus such as the freeze, the obvious danger is that, without such a focus, public interest in the dangers of nuclear war will wane. Is it possible for public interest to be sustained over a long period without dramatic initiatives, but with close attention to pragmatic proposals and the performance record of political leaders? There, perhaps, is the real challenge for the thoughtful and attentive public who did so much to foster the debate about the comprehensive freeze.

APPENDIX

The text of the Mexican/Swedish Freeze Resolution, 40/151C, at the UN, 1985, adopted by a vote of 131-10-8:*

The General Assembly

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, its second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation,

Noting that at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983 and at the Eighth Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held at Luanda, People's Republic of Angola, in September 1985, it was declared that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

*In an explanation of vote, the delegate from the Federal Republic of Germany indicated that although the FRG had abstained, it had intended to vote 'no.'