

## Chapter Six

### Confidence and Security Building Proposals

In the first five chapters of this study we have: looked at a number of arms control agreements that could be considered to be examples of Confidence-Building Measures; traced briefly the histories of MBFR and the CSCE; looked somewhat more carefully at Associated Measures and the Helsinki CMBs; surveyed analytic efforts to describe or define Confidence Building; and, finally, constructed our own "consensus" definition of and categories for Confidence-Building Measures. We have yet to subject the general notion of Confidence Building to critical analysis and when we do – in the next chapter – we will see that there are some serious problems with the idea of Confidence Building and with analytic efforts to conceptualize it. Before we do that, however, we should take a close look at the substantial collection of specific CBM proposals discussed in the literature, many of which are being considered at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We can gain a good sense of what the Confidence Building concept actually means by looking carefully at the functional characteristics of these proposals.

The sheer number and variety of Confidence-Building proposals discussed in the literature are daunting. Recent estimates maintain that there are between 60 and 100 distinct examples, although many of these are simply minor variations on more basic themes. Nevertheless, there are a good many distinctive Confidence-Building proposals.<sup>55</sup> The only reasonable way in which to deal with so many separate proposals is to group them according to an organizational scheme of categories. The set of categories developed in the previous chapter should serve this purpose well. The assignment of proposals to categories is inevitably arbitrary in some cases. Where this appears to be the case, a cautionary note is attached. The bulk of CBM proposals discussed here relate only to conventional military relationships. Some are intended to apply to strategic nuclear or intermediate nuclear relationships. A few are applicable in all three spheres. All are included in this discussion.

<sup>55</sup> Brayton's 1980 estimate is "over 60." "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *World Today* (October 1980), p. 387. Farago states (mid-1983) that recent studies "propose some one hundred possible confidence-building measures." "Confidence Building in the Age of Nuclear Redundancy" in Larrabee and Stobbe, p. 31.

#### Information and Communication CBMs

##### Information Measures

These measures encompass the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces and military policies including defence budgets, force deployments and military research and development. Because the point of many of these measures is to demystify adversary military behaviour and capabilities, measures involving military exchanges can also be included in this predominantly educational category.

1. **The publication and circulation (perhaps through a central administrative organization) of defence budget data.** This suggestion usually includes the further feature of a standardized reporting format. The obvious difficulty associated with this proposal has to do with the reliability of tendered information and its subsequent verification. The point of such proposals is to establish a baseline against which relative and absolute changes in defence spending can be noted. This will permit, it is argued, more accurate long range defence planning, thus militating against one commonly presumed cause of the arms race – over-reactions to the defence activities of adversary states. Whether acknowledged or not, this type of scheme must begin with accurate and consistent data or it cannot overcome the distrust and uncertainty it seeks to defeat. Regrettably, the Soviet Union, as well as a number of other states, does not currently publish reliable defence expenditure data for reasons of national security and there is little reason to think that this situation will soon change. Even if various states indicated a willingness to report their defence spending according to a standard format, there is no way of reliably confirming the accuracy of their submissions. Despite pretenses to the contrary, there is no available methodology that will support more than a casual estimate of the true defence expenditures of most countries.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>56</sup> For an illustration of difficulties see Franklyn Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" *International Security*, vol. 4, no. 4 pp. 86-104 and "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 4 pp. 78-101.

