ratio—to their importance. I suppose —if it were humanly conceivable— that a question—should arise—about —nothing at all,—that—it would last —for ever—and ever."

It is assumed that the terminology of Poker is a part of the common wisdom of mankind, though, perhaps, the Bench would refuse to take judicial cognizance of the fact that "three of a kind beats two pair." A case relating to the moving of a building from one place to another, was before a certain appellate Court, one member of which tribunal, with his usual appetite for minute detail, kept questioning the counsel. "You say, Mr. — that this house was—was raised?" "Yes, My Lord." "Now, Mr. — on what was it raised?" "On four Jacks, My Lord." Between questioner and questioned passed one gleam of sympathetic intelligence, but otherwise Bench and Bar were unmoved,—only an obscure junior in a back seat, who had had the personal ill-luck to experience similar unfortunate "raises," passed out of the court-room to lean over the balustrade and tell the mosaic pavement how funny a thing had been said.

Not a few amusing discussions arise about the pronunciation of words; and such philological questions have been known (for the moment), to quite obscure the point at issue. In a case involving consideration of some injury to the brain, the word "paresis" was used by several of the Judges in giving judgment, and pronounced invariably "parésis." When it fell to the turn of the last member of the Court to deliver himself, he called the word "párĕsis." It is said that his Chief, a few moments later presented him with this quatrain:

> "This word of your's 'păresis,'
> Our nice ears harasses;
> You would ease us, and please us,
> By saying 'parésis.'"

In the examination of a witness, a certain very learned Queen's Counsel used the word "peritoneum," and made the "o" long and accented. The Judge was ready for a little fun on the strength of the mispronunciation, but under-estimated the counsel's power of turning the tables. He said, "Mr. ——— that is *short*, is it not?" With the familiar twinkle came the reply, "On the contrary, my Lord: in the case of a full grown adult, it is rather long."

Really unkind things do not very often come from the Bench, but occasionally an unfortunate receives a crushing blow. A very pertinacious advocate of many years' standing at the bar was pressing his client's claim somewhat unduly. The Court was against him, and so informed him more than once. At length it was borne in upon him that what he desired was to be denied him, and in much despair of soul, he said, "But, my Lord, whatever in the world is my client to do?" He got his answer, *extra sec.* "My advice to him would be to consult a Solicitor."

Accuracy is most desirable in matters legal, but sometimes its bounds are over-stepped. An official of the court, distinguished for this virtue, recently had an affidavit placed before him in which it was stated that a certain event took place "in the end of May." He rejected it, pointing out, with much justice, that the month of May, like every thing else, had two ends, and the affidavit did not specify which of them was meant.

Perhaps this is paralleled by the Judge who refused to accept a mother's statement as to the date of her child's birth, "unless she could associate it in her mind with something collateral, in order that the time of the event might thereby be fixed."

Some years ago the "Bobtail Car Case" was argued by a great array of counsel, and all the law applicable, statutory and otherwise, was very elaborately expounded to the Court.

At the conclusion of a most erudite and pain staking leader's address, the Chief Justice remarked that he was surprised to find that no reference had been made to one of the most import-