## PHILOSOPHY: ITS RELATION TO LIFE, ETC. 183

a principle of regulation more inflexible for man than the principles of nature. Man may deny and violate natural law, bidding defiance to its material compulsion, and preserve that wholeness of inner truth which constitutes his integrity as man; but who can escape the commandments of his own inner nature, the law of self-realization which tells him: "What thou art, thou shalt act out and wherein thou violatest the right, thou thyself shall suffer loss?"

But these inner truths should be further emphasized for their own sake ; it is strange that they should ever need emphasis. Why. if all facts are sacred and none are intentionally outraged, why should not facts of mind be as valid as facts of nature? Why should not all facts of mind be as valid as any facts of nature? Why is the emotional recoil which all men feel in the presence of cruelty not as good evidence that cruelty is contrary to the order of biological development as is found in the bleeding tissue which is left by a cruel blow? Why is not the degenerate will which follows an egoistic theory of conduct, as valid evidence that self control is nature's higher law, as the physical effects which follow conduct on this theory? It is as valid evidence, though in the former case we appeal to consequences and in the latter case to law. But the former is law as much as the latter is law. Biological evolution is based upon a principle whereby needs arise where satisfactions are and satisfactions are not found where no need is; the economist develops the social organism on the same principle, that supply does not precede but always accompanies demand. Yet what treatment does the man receive at the hands of contemporary science, who claims that an ethical demand is sufficient proof of its own normal satisfaction and that mental intimations of immortality afford presumptive evidence of a future life? Yet the man of science knows that such inner experiences are facts, that they are experiences, and in the face of such knowledge, sweeps them away as sentiment or illusion and exhorts the man who is as good a scientist and a better philosopher than himself, by reason of a truer theory of experience, to curb his imagination, and not to trouble himself about consequences !

Again the natural sciences demand a further philosophy than the simple postulate of experience; for the possibility of experience, of a relation at all between man and nature, must have its philosophy. To go no deeper into the question "How is