gether every fact affecting a crime, and place it in the hands of some competent solicitor, by whom all may be sifted—what is worthless put aside, and the clue followed up where the evidence is weak. The Greenwich police are not lawyers, and they were not advised by a lawyer. On the first aspect of the facts, there were strong grounds for suspicion. It must be remembered, in their justification, that they were informed of a great deal that was not legal evidence, and that in the pursuit of justice it is necessary to pick up every thread that may guide to discovery. The commentators on the conduct of the case appear to forget that the police were in possession of a great deal which though not admissible in the witness box, is yet called "moral evidence"—that is to say, evidence which *influences* the judgment, though not legally controlling it. It is right to exclude such evidence at the trial, because it is open to a certain amount of question as being in some case unreliable; but no individual would dream of excluding those facts from his consideration on any matter, when his object was to form a fair judgment of the truth. The communications of the murdered girl to her friends as to her relationship with accused, were properly excluded from the witness box, because it would be most dangerous to condemn a man to punishment upon statements made by some person behind his back. But the police were bound to take these statements into consideration for the purpose of investigation, and to help their own judgments in the pursuit of legal evidence. It was, to say the least of it, a remarkable coincidence that she should have said so much before the murder about a man who on that very evening was found to be going, in a muddy state, in a direction from the very spot where she was killed. Extraordinary coincidences do occur, and from the evidence adduced for the defence this appears to be one of them. But the police must act according to the usual human experience, and they would have no right to treat concurrent facts as mere coincidences until they are proved to be so, and no proof of this was given until the trial produced the witnesses that answered the probabilities by the facts. What the poor girl had said about Pook could not, without gross injustice, have been put in evidence against Pook; but it could not fail to make an impression upon the mind, and to direct the suspicions of the police, and they are not to be blamed for acting upon those suspicions and following up the clue which had thus been given to them. Their error lay in not putting before the jury all the facts they had found. But, then, their answer to this is that the case was out of their hands, and had passed into the possession of the lawyers. Thus much is due to them.—*Law Times.*

Larceny—Animals Feræ Naturæ.

The Queen v. *Townley*, C. C. R. 19 W R. 725.

This case is of some value as illustrating the distinction between what will regarded as one continuous act, and what as to two distinct acts. The prisoner was indicted for a larceny of rabbits. He came in a cab and removed rabbits which had been hidden under a hedge, and it was found by the jury that they had been placed there by poachers, who had killed them on land in the same occupation as the place where they were found; it was also to be taken as a fact that the poachers had not intended to abandon possession of them. It was not found by the jury, or stated in the case as assumed, *but it was assumed by the Court* that the prisoner was himself one of the poachers. The Court held that the whole was one continuous act, and that therefore, although the rabbits did according to *Blades* v. *Higgs* (13 W. R. 727), become the property of the landowner on whose land they were killed, the prisoner was not guilty of larceny. This seems more in accordance with common sense, than the refinement as to an act "not continuated but interpolated," which seems sanctioned by the passage in 1 Hale, P. C. 510, commented on by the Court, and explained away in a manner which Lord Hale would probably not have approved. The lapse of time between one particular act and another, or even the temporary absence of the perpetrator from the spot where the goods lie, may be *evidence* of whether the whole is one thing, or whether the acts are to be taken as distinct; but it can be no more. The continued *intent* seems to be the distinguishing test. If, to use the illustration of orchard robbery quoted by Blackburn, J., from Lord Cranworth's judgment in *Blades* v. *Higgs*, the thief after picking the apples found them more than he could carry, and went home for a truck, would the continuity of the act have been broken? It would seem not. But if from lapse of time or from other circumstances it could be inferred that that the thief had given up his intention to remove the goods, but afterwards resumed it and removed them, it could no longer be said that the act was a continuous one.

The case might be noted by game law reformers as illustrative of the anomalies resulting from the present state of the law.—*Solicitors' Journal.*

There seems to be a curious desire to fasten upon the legal profession the character of ebriosity. If we are to give credence to all the charges which are so freely made in the present day, in reference to different classes of society, we must perforce conclude that we have fallen upon a crapulous age, however unconscious many of us may be of the unattractive phenomena which are said to be so patent to the observation of our more censorious contemporaries. The *American Law Review* tells us that