
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SECRET

Ottawa, 34 Apr 44.

APPRICIATION OF CALADIAN IARTICINATION

IN THE FACIFIC THEATRE OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. Canadian participation in the Pacific Theatre of War will necessarily be small in relation to the whole, or to the effort put forward by the United States or Great Britain. Consequently the Canadian effort will undoubtedly conform to the general strategical picture in whichever way Canadian Forces may be considered to be most effective.

2. It is proposed, therefore, to consider various ways in which Canadian Forces could be used to advantage under conditions that might be encountered after the collapse of Germany.

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CONSIDERATIONS OF FARTICIPATION

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3. Then Germany is defeated, the weight of the United Nations' war machine will be turned against Japan. The Canadian armed forces are not now actually committed against Japan, so that it will be necessary to come to a decision as to the nature and extent of the Canadian troops that will be sent to the Far East.

4. In considering Canadian participation in this far eastern war, several factors have a direct bearing on the question: military, political and moral, and commercial. These factors are not entirely separate one from the other, but to a great extent they are interrelated, but it is proposed to examine briefly the problem under each heading.

5. <u>Military:</u> At the present time Japan is estimated to have in being some 76 field divisions and 16 depot divisions. Of this number, 22 are reported to be in Japan (13 depot divs), 14 in MANCHURIA with 12 Tank Regiments and 13 Border Garrisons, 10 in North China with 10 mixed brigades, 14 Central China, 1 in South China, 8 in Burma and 12 in the Southwest Pacific (including Sumatra and the Mandates). It will be observed that a good proportion of this force is concentrated in MANCHURIA, and whatever action Russia takes after the German war it is unlikely that Japan can risk reducing the forces facing Russia in this area. It is unlikely therefore that the United Nations will be short of man-power to deal with Japan.

6. However, the nature of the ground on which the fighting will develop and the poor communications on land will make difficult the deployment of any very large overall preponderance of ground forces. The problem to be faced therefore will be how best to bring the right type of troops to the right places in sufficient strength to quickly overcome Japanese resistance.

> W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950, MG 26 J 4, Volume 408, pages C287138-C287875

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