excluding women when once they were admitted. It cannot, I think, be fairly said that their admission has had any marked effect upon the Bar or the practice of law; their influence on legislation for the protection of women and children is considerable, but not more than that of an equal number of women who have not joined the profession—what influence there is has been, I think, uniformly

Law of England." Where that was the case, the Legislature was attacked with the result stated in the text. I add here a partial account of the course of the campaign.

Mrs. Myra Bradwell was the first woman to meet a rebuff in the State Courts, so far as I have seen in the Reports: she in 1869 applied to the Supreme Court of Illinois for a licence to practise law, but failed. The Court thought itself bound by the Common Law of England to refuse the application unless "the Legislature shall choose to remove the existing barriers and authorise us to issue licences equally to men and women." *In re* Myra Bradwell, (1869) 55 Ill. 535. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to interfere, (1872) 16 Wall. 130. No long time elapsed before such authority was given. On March 22, 1872, an Act was approved "to secure to all persons freedom in the selection of an occupation profession or employment" which by s. 1 enacted "that no person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or employment (except military) on account of sex" (see Hurd's *Rev. Stat.* 1915–16, cap. 48, par. 2). In 1874, a further Act was passed "to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counsellors"; and that by s. 1 provided "No person shall be refused a licence under this Act on account of sex" (Hurd, *ut supra*, cap. 13, par. 1).

One of the Federal Courts was equally hostile. Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood in 1873 applied to be admitted as attorney and counsellor-at-law of the Court of Claims at Washington, a Federal Court of the United States. The Court held that the responsibilities of such a position were inconsistent with the holding of an office by a woman, and "a woman is without legal capacity to take the office of Attorney." *In re* Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood, exp. 9 Ct. of Cl. (Nott & Hop.) 346: sustained in the Supreme Court, 154 U.S. 116. Shortly afterwards the Supreme Court of the United States (October Term, 1876) refused to admit Mrs. Lockwood to practise in that Court "in accordance with immemorial usage in England and the law and practice in all the States until within a recent period." (See 131 *Mass. Rep.* at p. 383.)

Very shortly thereafter Congress acted: the Act of Congress, February 15, 1879, chap. 81 (20 Stat. L. 292) provides "Any woman who shall have been a member of the bar of the highest Court of any State or Territory or of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for the space of three years and shall have maintained a good standing before such Court and who shall be a person of good moral character shall on motion and the production of such record be admitted to practise before the Supreme Court of the United States." Under that statute, Mrs. Lockwood was admitted to practise in the Supreme Court. She was also admitted to practise in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and in certain of the State Courts, but her application was rejected in Virginia. The Supreme Court of the United States gave her no relief, (1893), 154 U.S. 116—and Virginia is still joined to its idols.

Miss R. Lavinia Goodell was no more successful in the Wisconsin Court in 1875; the Chief Justice, Ryan, thought that "reverence for all womanhood would suffer in the public spectacle of woman so engaged"; and in the absence of a statute her application was refused. *In re* Goodell, (1875), 39 Wis. 232.

Massachusetts then spoke to the same effect. Miss Lelia J. Robinson was