them according to their character. Experience cannot bridge the gulf between the past and the future.

But to our moral judgments this gulf is obliterated. I observe an act for the first time, and my moral nature pronounces judgment, not simply on that one act, but on all similar acts, past, present and future. There is more in the judgment than in the experience : *the experience is limited, the judgment is universal.*

Every man, therefore, who has moral convictions by which he can guide his future conduct, has something which experience may have *awakened*, but which it *never gave.*

The confidence which we have in the uniformity of nature, and in the perpetuity of moral distinctions, is due to intuition, and not to experience. And we may add, that if intuition gives us the idea of morality, it may give us also the idea of God.

It is enough, however, for us to know that the knowledge of morality by which Arnold proposes to direct our conduct, can only be attained in a way which he repudiates, and which is subversive of his whole system.

We answer—

(2.) That the ideas of *morality* and *perfection* are no more *fixed* and *definite* than the idea of *God.*

If morality is " conduct regulated in a certain manner," the manner in which it should be regulated is not always clearly ascertained and definite. The standard in England and in India is not the same. It is morality in India—even " morality touched with emotion "—for mothers to throw their children into the Ganges to be devoured by the monsters which infest the sacred river.

And, if perfection is for a man to reach " the best which his circumstances and powers allow him to reach," the question still returns, what is the *best ?* And Mr. Arnold will scarcely affirm that the same answer would be returned in Athens and in Jerusalem.

It will be found, moreover, that the ideas of morality and perfection vary almost exactly, as does the idea of God. It is true, there is something in common in the ideas of morality and perfection found in all lands, but it is equally true that there is some-