

Forces. The United Nations attempted to make up the resulting financial shortfall by authorizing in 1961 a \$200 million (U.S.) bond issue. Canada purchased \$6.4-million (U.S.) worth of bonds. In 1962, the Assembly also requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether expenditures for UNEF and ONUC constituted "expenses of the organization" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter, which provides for collective assessments. After the Court responded affirmatively, some member states began to pay their arrears, but the Soviet Union and France (until 1972) chose not to do so. As a result, the General Assembly agreed in 1965 to the recommendation of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping that the accumulated deficit for the two Forces should be dealt with, so far as possible, by supplementary voluntary contributions. Even before this decision was taken, Canada announced that it would donate \$4.3 million (Cdn) unconditionally. In spite of voluntary contributions by Canada and other countries, there remains an outstanding deficit of several million dollars attributable to the UNEF and ONUC operations.

The Security Council resolution that established UNFICYP in 1964 provided for its financing through voluntary contributions rather than by assessment. This has proved unreliable. Because deficits have plagued UNFICYP from the start, troop-contributing nations are not being reimbursed satisfactorily. Canada does not contribute to UNICYP's voluntary fund but absorbs the direct costs of maintaining its contingent in Cyprus, which have amounted to over \$25 million (Cdn) since 1964.

Financial arrangements for UNEF II and UNDOF, which are administratively a combined operation, reflect carefully-considered compromises among member states and provide a workable financial basis for the force. However, a few states are withholding their assessments, or a part thereof, and others are late in paying the amounts they have been assessed. The costs of UNEF/UNDOF are borne, through Security Council decision, by members in accordance with a special General Assembly apportionment. As an *ad hoc* arrangement, and without prejudice to the position of principle taken by member states, the General Assembly established a special account and a scale of assessment that placed the heaviest financial burden on the five permanent members of the Council and, in decreasing proportion, on the economically-developed and