

period the world share of the former Soviet states went from almost 40% to just under 20%, while the world share of military spending by the poorest 30% of countries remained constant at about 2%.³ The second prominent reality is that development assistance funding has also declined sharply and remains well below the formal objective of .7% of GNP. In the period from 1988-89, when Canadian military and ODA spending reached a peak, to 1993-94, Canadian military spending was cut by 2.4%, compared with a 15% cut in ODA spending. Planned additional cuts to 1998-99 will bring the total military spending cuts to 29%, compared with ODA cuts of 43%.⁴ In 1995, according to the North-South Institute, DAC countries spent .27% of GNP on ODA, despite an official goal of .7%, and from 1994 to 1995 ODA spending declined another 9%.⁵

So, while reducing military spending in capital poor developing countries is a widely shared and constructive objective, viewed as a global phenomenon, the problem of excessive capital being diverted away from constructive social purposes into non-productive military purposes is more acute in the North than in the South. And while the urge to make ODA as effective as possible in support of sustainable development is welcomed, the persistent decline in Northern ODA spending has led at least some in the South to wonder whether explorations of conditionality are rooted more in an effort to legitimize aid reductions than to promote military spending reductions.

³ James W. Moore, *Military Spending in the Developing World* (Project Report No. 9616, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy and Communications Group, Department of National Defence, Canada, August 1996), pp. 18-23.

⁴ Bill Robinson, "Cuts continue while DND drifts," *Ploughshares Monitor* (Vol. XVII, No.1, March 1996), p. 10.

⁵ *Fairness in a Shifting World: Canadian Development Report 1996-97*, The North-South Institute (Ottawa: Renouf, 1996), pp. 98-99.