

Recommendation 9: Discussion should continue on ways to improve the capacity of African nations to respond to African crises. We must recognize, however, that this crisis required rapid reaction; until such time as the Africans are militarily and politically organized to lead and conduct a large multinational operation effectively, other nations should not hesitate to respond to emergencies, while making every effort to involve regional countries to the extent possible.

Observation 10: Forward momentum was most effectively sustained when the Prime Minister was personally engaged.

The formation of the MNF was possible largely because the Prime Minister was actively engaged, and spoke directly to his counterparts in other countries. When management of the mission dropped to the level of Ministers and senior officials, it became more difficult to convince other members of the MNF to agree to a position. This might suggest that leadership of a large coalition by a smaller power requires the constant engagement of the highest political level.

Recommendation 10: Further study should be devoted to the relative effectiveness of heads of Government, Ministers and senior officials in these situations, to determine whether the most senior member of the Government must manage the leadership of the mission to compensate for the relatively smaller size of the nation.

The Use of the Military

Observation 11: The appropriate role for military force in this operation was often misunderstood or ignored.

The Zaire operation was a response to a "humanitarian crisis" which was itself the result of a political conflict. When some Humanitarian Agencies called for the assistance of an international military force, they were hoping that the military would go into the camps, separate and/or disarm the intimidators, and allow for the delivery of aid by the Agencies. The military was requested to address the military impediments to the delivery of aid, not to deliver the aid itself.