

ticularly noticeable that hitherto accepted political claims, which generally combine statements about national sovereignty and the need for greater defence effort against the threat from the Soviet Union, are seldom subject to rigorous questioning. It is not difficult to create a long list of contentious questions. For example, is it the case that the current inability of Canada to monitor military traffic in the Arctic — which is likely to continue — seriously prejudices Canadian sovereignty in general and claims to Arctic sovereignty in particular. If so, can the linkages be specified? Does the passage of submerged submarines through the North-West Passage, assuming some or even all of them to be US, seriously damage Canada's *legal* claim to sovereignty? If the USAF, operating primarily from Alaska and Greenland, were to conduct routine operations in the Canadian Arctic, using AWACS and F-15s, possibly without Canadian knowledge and in any case without any independent Canadian participation, what specific consequences would follow which would adversely affect Canadian interests, assuming that prior approval were requested and granted? Is it feasible for the Canadian Government to take the position that only *warning* of cruise missile attacks is required, thus insisting on the traditional distinction between warning as an essential element in deterrence, and active defence? And what would be the political implications of such a position if the Canadian Government were to decide not to pursue the Northern basing of CF-18s, and to advise the United States that it will not permit the basing of USAF F-15s in Canada even on a visiting basis? If, as was implied earlier in this paper, the diminishing contribution of Canada to continental defence leads to less knowledge about the defence of the continent and the related military activities of the United States, how important is that to real Canadian security interests and to the peacetime control of national territory? This question springs from the thought that since the ultimate calamity is hardly at issue — in reality no Government has taken seriously the question of how to defend Canada once a nuclear war begins — what situations short of war are at issue?

Whatever the answer to the last question, issues concerning military deployments in the Canadian North introduce a relatively forgotten element into the Canadian defence debate, namely domestic political requirements. A Canadian Government which rejected its nominal responsibilities for asserting a Canadian military and governmental presence in the Canadian Arctic is likely to find itself in serious electoral difficulty. Although the inability of Canada to monitor its northernmost territories can be finessed in some degree by stressing co-operative measures with the United States, the previous analysis implies that greater military resources will need to be committed to Arctic surveillance if Canadian claims to control are to be credible. In effect, much of this paper has addressed issues, including trends in bomber and cruise missile developments, emerging surveillance technologies, and ASW which all point to the increasing use of the Arctic for military purposes. Indeed, without Canadian participation, it is scarcely farfetched to envisage a future in which a wide band of the Canadian Arctic became, *de facto*, the exclusive area of military operation of the United States. The dilemmas of