

conscientiously, should imply. In essence, Canadians will assess such a policy by one simple test, and that is whether, as a consequence of supporting their Government's policy of *détente*, they are living in a safer and more humane world. How does the course we charted at Helsinki stand up to such a test?

We are bound to admit that, in the matter of improving security, the provisions of the Final Act are modest. The modesty of our achievement was recognized at the time because there is no other chapter in the Final Act in which our heads of government gave us greater latitude for future progress. But modest or not, we should not underrate the contribution that these confidence-building measures can make to a more stable and predictable environment in an area that remains the greatest area of armed confrontation — that is, Central Europe. We have gained experience in the operation of these measures over the past two years. We are hopeful that, without going beyond the intent of the Final Act, we may be able to refine their application and broaden their practice.

The mandate that has been given to us is limited. But the fact that it is limited does not absolve us from looking beyond it. The Final Act, in the end, finds its place in the wider conspectus of *détente*. And, if *détente* is a matter of increasing confidence, it is ultimately inconceivable that we can manage to increase confidence in the political realm while the arms race continues unabated. Political *détente* and a deceleration in the arms race must go hand in hand. The confidence created by each has a mutually-reinforcing impact on the other. Insecurity, like security, is indivisible.

We are not here to deal with matters of disarmament. That is the responsibility of other organs of the international system. But in our deliberations here we cannot afford to leave out of account the effect that a mounting build-up of military forces and armaments, going beyond the apprehended needs of defence, will have on stability and on confidence. We cannot leave out of account the disappointing progress that is being made in curbing the arms race in negotiations in Europe and elsewhere. We are at the end of the road of peripheral measures. We have come to the heart of the disarmament matter, which is actually to begin to disarm. No one pretends that the next steps will be easy. But we cannot expect to move forward along the disarmament road simply by making declarations of good faith or by trying to legislate intentions. We have only one option, and it is the hard option of dealing with capabilities, of limiting the capacity to wage war.

That is not, as I say, on the agenda of our meeting. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that, unless we are serious about that larger dimension of security, we can indefinitely sustain the support of our public opinions for the structure of co-operation that we put in place at Helsinki.