upon. But Mr. Wallace entirely misapprehended his position. This was not a contempt for the non-payment of money, or for disobeying some order of the Court in the progress of a suit, but a contempt levelled at the Court itself, and which the Court has the authority and the right to adjudicate upon of its own motion, without invoking the aid of any barrister, upon the production of the obnoxious letter by the Judge to whom it was addressed. In *Lechmere Charlton's case* (2 My. and Cr. 316) Lord Cottenham, then Lord Chancellor, pursued the course we have adopted here. Letters having been addressed by Mr. Charlton, a barrister and member of Parliament, to one of the Masters of the Court of Chancery, and to the Lord Chancellor, of a highly objectionable kind, and reflecting upon the proceedings of the master in an inquiry then before him, his Lordship, after directing copies to be served upon the parties concerned (here there are no parties to be served), took notice thereof in open Court, and after declaring that the letter to the Master contained scandalous matter, and that the conduct of Mr. Charlton, in writing the two letters, was a contempt of the Court of Chancery, passed an order that he should show cause on a certain day, why he should not be committed to the Fleet prison for his contempt. Mr. Charlton having failed to show cause, the Chancellor, after remarking that every writing, letter, or publication, which has for its object to divert the course of justice, is a contempt of the Court, and that every insult offered to a Judge in the exercise of the duties of his office, is a contempt, concluded by ordering Mr. Charlton's committal. This was effected at a subsequent day, and the House of Commons having refused to interfere, and Mr. Charlton having made a suitable submission, and expressed his contrition for the offence he had committed, he was discharged, after having been in prison for three weeks. It will be seen, therefore, that we have guided ourselves by a precedent of high authority, while our right to substitute a suspension from practice for imprisonment is too clear to be disputed. It is proper also to add, that we have looked into the cases of *Smith* v. *The Justices of Sierra Leone* (3 Moore's P. C. Cases, 361; and 7 Moore's P. C. Cases, 174), *In re Downie and Arrindell* (3 Moore's P. C. Cases, 414), in the Privy Council, cited from 3rd and 7th of Moore's P. C. Cases, as well as several others to be found in 1st Knapp's Reps., and 1st and 8th Moore's P. C. Cases. In addition to the technical and other grounds we have thus disposed of, in the place of the apology, which, as I have said, this Court might reasonably have expected, and which any judicious adviser would certainly have recommended, Mr. Wallace produced an affidavit made by himself, which aggravates his offence, and is an accumulation of fresh insults. Had we thought fit, we would have been justified in refusing to receive this affidavit, or in interrupting him while reading it. As we had already pronounced his letter to be a contempt, it was not competent for him to attempt a justification, and he could show cause only by denying, if he could, or if possible, explaining away or extenuating his offence. But we preferred affording him a full hearing, and as no letter or affidavit of his could touch the reputation of this Bench, or any member of it, we allowed him to go on without interfering. This affidavit is the more inexcusable because in the nature of things it could not be answered. Parts of it are founded upon hearsay, which is not evidence, and in the most trifling matters is not admissible in this Court. Parts of it rest upon the mere assertion of Mr. Wallace, at variance with all our impressions and recollections, but in which he must pass of course uncontradicted. And much of it relates to recent transactions in the knowledge of one or other of the members of the Bar, or of the officers of the Court, and which are represented in a manner quite inconsistent with the facts, and with the papers on the file. We content ourselves with these general observations, for it is obvious that to descend into details, and stoop to a vindication of this Court, would be a complete surrender of its independence and its dignity. If Judges forget their duty, if they lay themselves open to imputation, and are amenable to censure, adequate remedies are provided by the law and constitution of the country. A single Judge at every step is subject to control. Every