

As it was a diplomat who was kidnapped, our Department was immediately seized of the problem because of our international legal obligations under the various conventions for the protection and well-being of diplomats.

At what point were the kidnappers' demands made known and what was the immediate reaction to them?

A communiqué giving the kidnappers' demands was received around mid-afternoon on the day of Mr. Cross' abduction.

The demands in the order they put them in were: All police investigations to be stopped. A manifesto of the FLQ to be published in the press and on television. The release of 23 so-called political prisoners. Air transport to move the prisoners to Algeria or Cuba. Rehiring of the La Palme mail-delivery workers in Montreal. A ransom of \$500,000. And public disclosure of the identity of an alleged informer who the FLQ apparently believed had caused some problems for them. Those were the initial demands.

On the surface, it didn't seem that all these demands were of equal seriousness or importance. Part of the document was obviously propaganda.

There was a series of immediate consultations between Ottawa and Quebec at various levels, leading to the position announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on October 6. Mr. Sharp then confirmed receipt of the FLQ note, summarized the seven conditions which it contained, declared them a wholly unreasonable set of demands, and went on to say that he hoped the FLQ would communicate further with the authorities.

At what point was work actually started on the safe conduct as a contingency?

It was felt from the start that a safe conduct for the kidnappers themselves would not be too difficult a problem. It could have been arranged very quickly. But one must remember that the kidnappers were talking about the release and safe conduct of prisoners who had been condemned by normal legal processes, not for their opinions but for crimes. Their release was certainly not in the cards. When planning for a safe conduct, what we were prepared to think about was the possibility of transport out of Canada for the kidnappers themselves.

Soon after the initial communiqué became public knowledge, the Governments of Cuba and Algeria were advised, as a matter of courtesy, that their countries had been mentioned in these communiqués; from that point onward we kept in touch with the two governments.

At the outset we naturally concentrated our effort on what to make of the set of unacceptable demands which confronted us. The Government of Canada and the government of Quebec tried to decide to what extent these people could be influenced, what could be done to keep them from killing. The first stage was one where the main concern of the Government was to keep a dialogue going while the situation was being assessed.... Hence the broadcast of the manifesto as requested by the kidnappers, and the offer of talks.