

3); and the conclusion is inevitable that had Belgium been left alone, we should nevertheless have joined in the war.

It may be said that the United Kingdom stood aside in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and that she might have done so again. But the situation had entirely changed. In 1870, united Germany had not come into existence, and of Prussia there was no dread; Prussia's navy was inconsiderable, and there had been no German scares; pan-Germanism had not been heard of, and "velt-politik" was still in the future. In 1870, national animosities and suspicions between the two empires had not arisen. In 1914, they permeated all ranks of both nations. Why? Why could not both have been reasonable? I don't know. Ask Ireland and the school board again? It was the fault of the other fellow. It always is.

The Future

These, then, are the causes of the war. The murder of Francis Ferdinand was the single precipitating cause. If it had not happened some other incident would have produced the same result. And the predisposing causes were (1) national and racial antipathies, (2) huge alliances, and (3) preparedness for war.

What hope is there for better conditions in the future? For Europe, I confess that I am pessimistic. I see no chance for any abatement in national and racial antipathies, and while those exist we shall have alliances and preparations. Until scholarly men, in such countries as England and Germany, can make some approach to common comprehension of patent facts, and to fair appreciation of different viewpoints, there can be little ground for expectation of the arrival of that international good-feeling in which disturbing incidents easily dissolve and rapidly disappear.

It is said that German militarism must be crushed. And leave British navalism? Germany must be reduced to helplessness. And leave Russia and France powerful? No, that will not do, for two very good reasons: (1) Peace arranged upon a dishonouring basis would be but the merest pretence of a truce; and (2) in a very few years, we may wish that Germany was strong enough to help us against Russia or (less probably) against France. It is not very long since Russia was the enemy; since Kipling's poem of "the bear with hands like a man"; since Chamberlain's impeachment of her treachery — "who sups with the devil must have a long spoon"; since Chamberlain's proposal for the triple alliance of the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany (An. Reg. 1899, p. 227) ; and since the British-Japanese treaty, having for its object the enfeebling of Russia (Jan. 30, 1902).

There can be no permanency in arrangements which involve enforced limitations upon the sovereign power of any great nation within its geographical limits. The treaty of 1856 prohibited warships in the Black Sea, and "military-maritime arsenals" on its coasts; and the treaty of 1878 prohibited the fortification of Batoum. The prohibitions lasted until Russia was in position to disregard them. No virile nation will, or ought to, stand degradation.