

had been pursued and carried out. My hon. friend told us, not in so many words, but I think we could very well read between the lines that if it had not been for the efforts of the British ambassador, if it had not been for the whole hearted support of the British government, his mission to Japan would have probably resulted in an absolute and utter failure—I do not know whether it is much more than that as it is—but it would have resulted in an absolute and utter failure, he would have been dismissed from the Japanese government with a few polite expressions and he would have returned to this country no wiser than when he left. I think that would have been probably the result and it is rather an amusing commentary upon the recent declarations of hon. gentlemen who occupy the treasury benches as to the great revolution which has been wrought in the affairs of this empire, a revolution under which they now take charge of all treaties that specially concern Canada. The boasts made by my right hon. friend the Prime Minister (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) and the boasts of my hon. friend the Minister of Marine and Fisheries (Mr. Brodeur) have been heard in this country during the past five or six months, more especially in regard to the French treaty and not very much, I am bound to say, in regard to the treaty with Japan which they themselves negotiated and for which they are solely and absolutely responsible.

Well, the hon. Postmaster General took the right course. This government had got Canada into a very serious difficulty and the Postmaster knew that this government was rather powerless to extricate itself from that difficulty; therefore he had to invoke and did invoke the support of the British ambassador and of the British government as well. Whether or not everything could have been accomplished by \$500 worth of telegrams from Ottawa to Tokio and from Ottawa to London I do not know, but I am prepared to assert that any success which my hon. friend achieved in Tokio, as he, himself, no doubt will be prepared to admit, and as he, himself, has, in fact, admitted, is largely due—practically altogether due—to the support of the British ambassador at Tokio.

Now, the question with which we are concerned to-day is a very important question. It is one fraught with momentous issues to this country and it is a question which probably will confront the people of this country when all those who are within the sound of my voice to-day have passed off the scene. It is the great question of world politics which must be worked out on the Pacific ocean in the years to come; it is the great question of the influence that the great nations of the orient, aroused to modern methods and organized as they have not been organized before, will exercise upon the destinies of the world and especially

Mr R. L. BORDEN.

upon the Pacific. This question, while at the present moment it is one within a rather narrow compass, is, after all, a very great question and we are only upon the fringe of it to-day in discussing the question of the control of immigration from the great empire of Japan to the Dominion of Canada.

We all know that in 1894 treaties were negotiated by Japan with various countries. In 1894 a treaty was negotiated between Great Britain and Japan. That treaty did not bind the self-governing colonies of the empire but by article XIX of the treaty it was competent for any of these self-governing dependencies to accede to the treaty, to take advantage of it and to be bound by its terms. In the same year the United States negotiated a treaty with Japan and so far as this question of the control of immigration is concerned there was a marked difference between the terms of the British treaty and those of the United States treaty. The United States reserved to itself the right to control the immigration of labourers from Japan into the United States, as has been shown to this House in a very lucid and exhaustive manner by my hon. friend from Nanaimo (Mr. Ralph Smith) in a debate which took place earlier this session. The British treaty with Japan made no such provision, because so far as Great Britain was concerned the possible danger which confronted the United States did not confront the British isles. The British isles, thickly populated and at a great distance from Japan were in no danger of any immigration from that country which could in any way affect the economic interests and the labouring population of the British isles. In the United States the reverse was the case. Japan had awakened; the Pacific had become merely a magnificent highway between the orient and this continent, and so the United States took the precaution, when they entered into a treaty with Japan in 1894, to insert a stipulation which is not to be found in the treaty negotiated between Great Britain and Japan that same year.

It is necessary for the purpose of what I desire to submit to the House, to review to some extent the negotiations between the government of Canada and the Colonial Office of Great Britain with respect to the terms of this treaty and with respect to the conditions upon which Canada was willing to accede to it. I have in my hand a copy of an order in council which was passed by the Conservative administration of the day, on August 3, 1895. The treaty, as the House will remember was negotiated in 1894, and shortly afterwards it was submitted to all the self-governing colonies of the empire. In 1895 it came under the consideration of the Canadian government, and on the 3rd of August, 1895, this order in council to which I refer was passed. I shall read it so that the House and the coun-