

the evidence connected with their object, has been discerned; or "as he," as Lord Brougham expresses it "can no more change them than he can the hue of his skin, or the height of his stature;" that therefore *he* cannot be responsible for them, and *they* cannot be made legitimately the subject of praise or blame.

This we conceive a fair statement; and at first sight we frankly admit it appears not a little plausible. But in answer we shall endeavour to establish the following positions, involving the proof of the directly opposite conclusion,—viz: that man is, and that most legitimately, the subject of responsibility for every belief which he entertains.

1st. That the above statement of the mode in which belief arises, and exists in the mind,—especially in so far as belief on moral and religious subjects is concerned,—is partial and defective, and overlooks an essential element involved in belief, and to which alone it is intended that responsibility attaches.

2nd. That it is not true, that in the formation of our beliefs, the will is not concerned; but that on the contrary, in reference to our beliefs on all moral and religious subjects, the will is concerned, and so far concerned as to involve the responsibility, which is admitted to belong to the products of the will. And,

3rd. That even if it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the will cannot conclusively be shown to be concerned in belief, that still this would not exempt belief from responsibility; but that on the simple assumption, that God has presented evidence of any truth, the belief of the opposite must necessarily involve criminality and sin.

1. It is assumed then, as the basis of the argument for man's non-responsibility, that a man *necessarily* believes, according as evidence presents itself to his mind. And undoubtedly so far as belief is the product of mere intellect or reason, as contradistinguished from the *emotive* element of man's nature, and of that reason exercised about objects which address themselves to *reason alone*, the assumption is just. In such a case, belief is clearly the natural and necessary effect of the apprehension of the evidence by the reason. The examination of that evidence may, or may not, have been the product of will; but the belief itself, is just the irresistible assent of the mind to the evidence within its view. A man, for instance, cannot examine the records and the