

*Supply—National Defence*

have. It is possible that the minister will be able to deal with some of the criticisms I make and dispose of some of the questions I raise before the end of this discussion.

Since world war II and indeed, I believe, until 1957, the concept of defence policy, the nature of the threat and the means of encountering it were all based on principles and planning derived from the experience and lessons of world war II, just as we entered world war II with plans based on the experience and lessons of world war I. It seems to be the fate of man, as long as he has been engaged in war, to begin one war in accordance with the methods which may have been successful in the previous one but which are really not appropriate for the war in which he is engaging.

It is quite true that after world war II and even during it atomic weapons had been developed, but their use and method of delivery, I suggest up until about 1957, were an extension of earlier ideas rather than entirely new ideas in themselves; that the picture both for defence and offence was reasonably familiar and followed the general pattern of the last war; that the nature of the defence problem had not changed in essentials, even though it had certainly changed in scale and in scope.

True, the political mechanism of defence through collective security introduced in NATO was new. This is perhaps more political than military. The pooling of strength in an organization like NATO with collective responsibilities discharged by collective action planned and organized in advance was a new concept. If we had had such collective arrangements in 1939 the world might be a far better place today and we might not be participating today in this kind of defence debate. Perhaps it is just as well to remember this amidst the clamour from certain quarters that we should do away with collective security in the alleged interest of easing of tension and facilitating negotiations.

Then, Mr. Chairman, two years or so ago, in the fall of 1957, in my view the whole defence picture changed in a very fundamental way. The first satellite went into orbit from the Soviet union and the intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile became a reality. An entirely new dimension of war was introduced at that time; an entirely new problem of defence was created. Perhaps this development may turn out to be even more important in warfare than the invention of gunpowder. Surely therefore, Mr. Chairman, it became of the most obvious and the most vital importance for all western countries, including our own, to re-examine the whole

[Mr. Pearson.]

basis of defence policy in the light of this new situation, associated as it was with the frightening growing power and effectiveness of the nuclear weapon, perhaps the ultimate weapon.

Surely, Mr. Chairman, this was the time for the great debate, for a complete re-assessment, agonizing or otherwise. We have had such a debate extending over many, many months in the United States congress, the results of which the minister may have read in the publications that emerged from the committee hearings. I attempted to read them, and they are in hundreds of hundreds of pages by now. We have had that kind of debate at Westminster where the government in the last two white papers on defence has certainly shown its awareness of those changes I have mentioned. In 1957 the United Kingdom government in its white paper on defence said:

The time had come to revise not merely the size, but the whole character of the defence planning; to make a fresh appreciation of the problem and the new approach to it.

The United Kingdom has done just that, especially in connection with air defence of the island. The white paper also had this to say on page 5:

It is only now—

This was in 1957.

It is only now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a comprehensive reshaping of policy to be undertaken with any degree of confidence.

I ask the question, Mr. Chairman; is there any evidence that this comprehensive reshaping of policy is required in Canada and that it is being undertaken? The minister's statement this morning, interesting as it was, does not suggest that any fundamental re-assessment, re-examination or reshaping of that kind is taking place. Now, it may well be that Canada's direct relationship to these defence changes, these defence developments of which I have spoken, does not compare in importance with that of London or of Washington. But we have our part to play in these developments, and that part is one of very real significance, both politically and militarily, even though Canada's contribution to collective defence seems very often to be ignored or merely lumped with the British or American effort.

I think we in this house should know—and I am not at all certain that we have the information from the minister's first statement—what Canada's role is to be in relation to these new situations, these new circumstances. It seems to me that all we know at present is that our role is to be dominated to a greater extent than ever before by Washington. And I say that as one who believes