

It was suggested that part of the Soviet price for their finally accepting a united Germany in NATO might be that Germany pay for the resettlement of their East German troops.

Notwithstanding proposed concessions of this sort, we detected considerable uncertainty within Germany about whether the Soviet Union would in the end accept Germany's NATO membership. While Lutz Stavenhagen, State Minister in the West German Government was confident the USSR would eventually come around, both Eberhardt Schultz and Michael Sturmer, two of Germany's leading foreign policy analysts, were less sure. Sturmer remarked: "We have assumed they will play our game, but will they? They did not lose the war and in the end we have no way of forcing them out. Unity will occur but the Red Army is sitting on the assets."

We were struck by a remark made by the Foreign Minister of West Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who appeared before the Committee in April. In response to a question about the various designs for re-forming NATO, he remarked: "The plans are what people think the future will be but I think we are now on the right way in our negotiations." Accepting the distinction between designs for the future and a clear course of direction, the Committee's purpose here is not to add to the list of blueprints but to offer our thoughts on the goals that should guide this work. As we see it, there are two major long term objectives in building the new Europe:

Cooperative Security

The question of a united Germany in NATO may prove to be a very hard nut to crack in the 2+4 talks, as the results of the recent superpower summit would indicate. The Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to accept the proposition, argued earlier for participation of a united Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact or a neutral Germany. Neither of these options seems very practical or attractive, the former because the Warsaw Pact appears to be dissolving, the latter because it would isolate Germany by leaving it in a kind of security no-man's-land. Failure to resolve this issue might result in another unhelpful outcome, namely the indefinite maintenance of 350,000 Soviet troops on East German soil.

We would not rule out the possibility that some creative, ad-hoc arrangements might satisfy Soviet concerns and that they would then accept a united Germany in NATO. There