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agreements pursuant to the treaty; it is disturbing, as well, that two nuclear states remain unwilling to accept even the very limited obligations that would be placed upon them if they chose to accede to the NPT. My delegation earnestly hopes that such states will, as a minimum, maintain policies consistent with the objectives of the NPT and that they will respect the efforts of the parties to the treaty to fulfill their obligations, particularly with regard to Article III, concerning the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

I should like now to turn to the other item that has been before the CCD as a matter of priority -- the banning of chemical weapons. Again, the CCD has not made the progress we had hoped for in its efforts to negotiate a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. But my delegation, for one, has yet to be satisfied that any of the proposals so far envisaged will provide the necessary security guarantees for a treaty to be generally acceptable and effective.

Let us consider the current situation regarding chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, forbidding their use, has been in effect for nearly 50 years and is widely accepted as expressing a norm of international law. Unquestionably, its effectiveness has been reinforced and given substance by the fact that, by and large, nations have been reluctant to use chemical weapons, not simply for moral or political reasons but also for practical military considerations. Their use carries with it the probability of retaliation and the necessity to adopt difficult protective and defensive measures. It is evident that a key factor that has led certain countries to chemical-weapons development, production and stockpiling programs has been the desire to deter by the threat of retaliation the possible use of chemical weapons by potential enemies.

In attempting to draw up a treaty banning development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the CCD is aiming to make a contribution to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament and in the interim to limit the dimensions of war-making. But, more specifically, it is seeking to find a way of reinforcing the Geneva Protocol by eliminating the weapons of chemical warfare. This would mean that trust in the effectiveness of such a treaty would replace the deterrent value of maintaining chemical weapons. If governments are to be persuaded to abandon the right to exercise this measure of deterrence, they must be satisfied that the treaty will provide an equal or better standard of protection; in other words, there must be an effective system of verification, in which all parties to the treaty will have confidence.

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