

restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and legitimate government.⁴⁸ In the end, it was necessary to use substantial military force (in which Canada participated) and it must unfortunately be admitted that, two years after the cessation of military hostilities, tension remains high in the region.

- In the case of the USSR in 1980, Canada did not interrupt grain shipments under then-existing contractual commitments, so as not to violate the bilateral Canadian-Soviet trade agreement of 1956. On a number of occasions, however, we did restrict or block lines of credit to the Soviet Union, cancel cultural or scientific exchanges, and cancel or postpone visits by ministers or senior officials. We also asked the Canadian Olympic Committee not to participate in the Moscow Olympics in 1980, to which the Committee agreed.
- Our trade volume with Haiti was very small (exports of \$15 million, imports of \$11 million in 1991) to begin with. This already scanty trade plummeted and would be almost nothing were it not for donations of foodstuffs and humanitarian goods. The number of Canadian tourists heading for Haiti fell off after the events surrounding the fall of President Duvalier and has never recovered. We issue few visas but immigration programs continue to operate for humanitarian reasons. People with known ties to the new regime are refused visas. Canadian investment in Haiti is negligible. The sanctions therefore caused little harm to our economy. It might be argued that the withdrawal of Canadian aid, limited as it was, did cause some additional hardship to the population, although this harm was partly compensated for by the maintenance and indeed increase in our assistance through NGOs and multilateral organizations.
- In the case of China, a number of countries, including Canada, reacted vigorously in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square events. Although we were careful not to call the measures sanctions, the Chinese did. In a speech delivered in late June 1989, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark listed three major criteria which would guide the Canadian government's actions with respect to China. While EDC export financing remained available, sales of equipment destined for

⁴⁸ "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Effect of the Sanctions Against Iraq, before the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade," (90-73), Ottawa, December 10, 1990.