

Conclusion

Having analyzed the use of multimethod verification in the Sinai and then considered the Sinai model in other contexts, it is appropriate to return to the propositions posed at the outset of this study and to offer some tentative conclusions.

- *Proposition 1*

Arms control and verification regimes can be created and sustained in regions plagued by endemic violence.

The Sinai experience provides clear evidence that an arms limitation and verification regime can be developed and sustained in regions plagued by endemic violence. Once parties trapped in a long cycle of bitter hostilities with no history of political co-operation accept that they can no longer impose unilateral solutions on each other and decide further to achieve some of their security objectives jointly, then an opportunity to manage the conflict in less costly ways becomes available.

At this juncture, a credible and vigorous third party may prove critical in facilitating the design of an initial disengagement formula that does not undermine military-strategic positions and establishes tangible indicators of compliance.

With acceptance of the disengagement formula, the parties may then develop the norms, rules and procedures necessary to ensure effective verification of the agreement. In regions of persistent violence, more than a single third party, each with its own source of legitimacy and verification responsibilities, may be necessary to ensure the political and military success of the enterprise. As the Sinai experience illustrates, sustaining the verification regime in this kind of setting is likely to depend on a series of multimethod and interlocking verification responsibilities that provide the parties with reassurance and a sense of fairness.

- *Proposition 2*

Third parties can facilitate the creation of arms control regimes as well as assist the parties in verifying new agreements.

Clearly, in the aftermath of hostilities or in situations where there is no credible local third party, a trusted third party from outside the region may act as the essential catalyst in helping to create a verification regime and, in the process, directly assist the parties in managing the risks of any new agreement. As the key role played by the US in the Sinai showed, a third party with strong political commitment, financial resources and a willingness to make technical expertise available on a timely basis, can make the difference between the success or failure of the peace-building enterprise.

While it has been argued throughout this study that third-party roles are central to the creation of effective verification regimes in conflict-prone areas, it is important to emphasize that in the Sinai case, the role played by the US was unique and, as such, may not be readily applicable to other cases. This may suggest that in other regional settings requiring third-party-assisted verification, superpower involvement may be inappropriate or unnecessary. In other settings, such as central Europe, a disengagement agreement might be verified by a third-party group indigenous to the region or by various international organizations — both of whom might be more suitable to the verification task.

- *Proposition 3*

Effective verification measures can contribute significantly to risk management and confidence-building in disputes where there is little or no history of conflict management.

In the Sinai experience, the relationship between verification and confidence is best indicated by the transition from the Sinai II Agreement (1975) to the signing of a formal Peace Treaty in 1979. The Treaty may be viewed, in part, as an extension of previous agreements through which the parties learned incrementally about the benefits of rule-making and reciprocally binding behaviour. Whereas in the early stages of the disengagement process the verification task focussed on early warning detection, a successful record of compliance over time gave the parties increased confidence in the verification system. The development of confidence

