

Both the United States and Soviet Union would likely resist intrusive on-site inspection measures for a bilateral freeze, but Soviet cooperation in monitoring a ban would be politically desirable to reassure American legislators and to deter cheating. The Soviets have lately become more open with military data and more cooperative in monitoring agreements, which suggests a positive trend. In June 1982, the Soviet Union announced that it would agree to open up civilian nuclear plants to IAEA safeguards. Consultation and cooperation procedures could be furthered by establishing a consultative mechanism similar to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) created by the SALT I Agreement (see abstract J67(T72)) or even expanding the mandate of the SCC.

National governments may wish to conduct routine inspections of weapons in their own stockpiles and this could pose a problem for verification of the cessation of activity at facilities producing nuclear components. A moratorium on activity would require the cessation of maintenance checks also, but this would not create a major security risk since this activity apparently consists of limited spot checks only. Another verification problem would be created by an agreement which allowed the replacement of warheads, but the replacement issue could be avoided by designing a production freeze in stages of limited duration and rapidly following this with negotiations on weapons reductions.