

James Stark, head of Operation Dismantle, asked Al Carnesale why he considered disarmament an unrealistic alternative. Dr. Carnesale responded that nuclear disarmament was, in his opinion, just as unlikely as the possibility that a technological breakthrough would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Specific options should be pursued only if they could effectively reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Anatol Rapoport, of the University of Toronto, argued that social reality was shaped by what we said and wrote about it. Thus, nuclear disarmament was only unlikely, if we believed and said and wrote that it was unlikely.

Mr. Garwin asked the participants to consider what might happen if we did achieve nuclear disarmament. Would the situation be stable? What would we have to do to protect and maintain a disarmed world? While it was acceptable to consider alternative worlds a great deal of effort was required right now to maintain the perilous security that we had.

Denis Healey agreed that what was important was preventing a war between the superpowers. Nuclear war would be made less likely by controlling the arms race and achieving security at lower levels and at a lower cost. It would involve co-operation, not just on these military questions, but on political questions as well, especially those involving instabilities in the Third World and the situation in Eastern Europe. Canada and Britain, along with other middle and smaller powers, had an interest in persuading the superpowers to co-operate. American policy, he argued, was the outcome of bureaucratic battles between Congress and the White House, between the State Department and the Pentagon. The allies of the United States could swing the tide of that battle as had happened with the recent debate over the correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty [See Section III].

Ann Adelson, a peace activist of the Toronto Disarmament Network, said that with the advent of SDI the "front-line" had changed from Europe to North America. NORAD, she said, would be integrally connected with space-based ballistic missile defence. How could Canada say "no" to SDI without saying "no" to NORAD? Mr. Hagen argued, on the other hand, that the early warning of attack was probably the most benign and valuable exercise that a sovereign state could perform. Canada's withdrawal from NORAD would be counter-productive and impossible from a diplomatic point of view.