

labor, the simple functions of life. Slowly life, as it is developed, differentiates into several senses,—taste, hearing, seeing, etc.,—with corresponding organs. Similarly there has been evolved out of experiences of men who originally could have made no ethical distinctions the lofty moral conceptions of to-day. The race has learned by experiences courses of conduct which are promotive of its well-being, and at the same time, it has acquired a moral sense which intuitively responds to the distinctions which we have learned to make. Although intuitive in civilized man, the conscience, the “instinct of duty,” is the result of acquirement in the race and a highly complex product of human culture. It is not the voice of God. It approves and condemns according to the convictions of its possessor, and these depend upon character, education, and surroundings.

Thus morality has its foundations in the mental constitution and in the nature of things, and the fine moral sense which equally with the starry heavens filled Kant with wonder and awe, is the very efflorescence of evolution. This view of the intuitional character and at the same time of the experiential origin of conscience is an important modification of the utilitarian theory necessitated by the conception of evolution.

The moral life involves a struggle only when the lower nature, the savage in man, is still strong and hard to resist. With the highly-evolved man virtue is second nature. The right course is pursued without any sense or feeling of coerciveness. The man who is good organically does good easily, naturally, almost instinctively. His aspirations and inclinations are in harmony. But this condition never could have been reached had not the struggle to overcome evil, with all its failures and conquests, been continued through countless generations of ancestral life. The whole history of civilization from the dawn to the present time, is a record of experiences which have educated us into our present moral conceptions.

The *practical* agreement between the intuitive and the inductive and utilitarian systems is indicated by Whewell, who remarks that “if a reverence for general maxims of morality, and a constant reference to the common precepts of virtue take the place in the utilitarian’s mind, of the direct application of his principle, there will remain little difference between him and the believer in original moral distinctions; for the practical rules of the two will rarely differ, and in both systems the rules will be the moral guides of thought and conduct.” For be it remembered that Whewell holds that “if we could take into account the whole happiness produced by virtuous feelings, we could commit no practical error in making the advantageous consequences of actions the measure of their morality.”

Mackintosh, in illustrating the distinction between the criterion of morality and the nature of our moral sentiments, says: “Man may be so constituted as instantaneously to approve certain actions, without any reference to their consequences, and yet reason may nevertheless

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