

motive, either the subjective impulse or feeling itself, or we may mean by it only the object of such character or relation as excites it, or the object of such character or relation as gratifies it. This might be called three "uses"; but philosophically it is only two methods of use, the first referring to the impulse or feeling itself, the second referring to the exciting or gratifying causes.

These three uses of the word motive are quite common: for instance, on one person enquiring of another what motive led a third individual of their acquaintance to commit suicide, he may be answered that it was "disappointed love." In this case it is the subjective sense itself that is mentioned as the motive. He might also be told that the motive of their friend's suicide was the "slighting treatment which he received from a lady." This would not be giving the subjective feeling itself as a motive, but merely the object of character or relation exciting it. But, again, on asking what motive led their acquaintance to shoot himself in preference to any other mode of death, he may be answered that it was "that his death might be expeditious." In this case, it is the object of gratifying character or relation that is given as a motive, not the subjective feeling itself, which is "fear of pain."

In strict language, however, it is the subjective feeling itself that is the true motive; for it is it alone that is capable of exciting in the Ego the subjective feeling of resolution or consent.

Let us now show the reason why all of these are called motives, and also explain the relations which the objective or outside exciting and gratifying motives sustain to the true or subjective one.

The reason why in each of these cases the word motive has a right to be applied is this: A motive, to be a spring of action, must be a cause.

Though the subjective feeling or impulse is itself the true or real cause, yet, if there were no object of exciting character or relation, there would be no cause to rouse the subjective feeling into a state of activity or impulse; and if there were no object of gratifying character or relation, there would be no cause to attract the stimulus of the subjective feeling, while in a state of activity, towards its natural gratification, there could be no distinct presence, motives. There is first, then, the real or subjective motive; and secondly, the two acts on the subjective resolution or consent, and the subjective resolution or consent acts on the subjective energy. There are thus, in all, five factors in every act of the will. It is important, therefore, to note the relations which these factors bear to one another, and also to make a clear distinction between the objective motives or conceptions and the subjective motive.

There is first, then, the impulse of the subjective feeling itself, which is the true motive, and which we may distinguish as the Subjective Motive Proper. Then, second, there is the conception, or object of gratifying character or relation, which we distinguish as the Objective Motive Proper. It is proper, because it is the outside object, towards which properly the impulse of the subjective feeling presses, through the resolution or consent, for its appropriate gratification; and, third, there is the conception or object of exciting character or relation, which we call the Objective Motive Excitant. It arouses the subjective feeling—in other words, generates the impulse which brings the two motives proper into action.

It is scarcely necessary to remark to those who have heretofore read these pages carefully, that the objective motive proper and the objective motive excitant are often one and the same, because the conception, or object, of such character or relation as excites a subjective feeling, is often that which gratifies it.

Again, another important relation which the objective motive proper (or gratificatory) and the objective motive excitant, sustain to the true or subjective motive proper, is observable in the fact, that it is only by the actual perception, inception, or memory of these objective motives (in other words, by actually thinking of them), that the Ego can at any moment really perceive, or be conscious of, the subjective feeling or true motive within himself, so that he can be either sensible of it or feel its force.

For illustration of this let us look at the history of a subjective feeling. The Ego in the first case, looks at the object of exciting character or relation, which arouses the subjective feeling or impulse into a state of activity; and in the second case, the Ego, then under the force of this impulse, looks at the object in the gratifying character or relation, which the impulse itself suggests, and to which it prompts. At the moment in which he looks at the exciting object, he perceives the ensuving sentiment of his own mind as a subjective feeling, with tension having no outlet or direction. At the moment in which he looks at the gratify-

*The word "look" or "looks" in these and many following sentences, is used in the sense of "thinking of," viz., perceiving, conceiving, or remembering.