

plaintiffs' goods were injured. The plaintiffs alleged the ship was unseaworthy, in that the stove was placed too near to a bulkhead, and that as the defendant must be taken to be privy to the position of the stove he could not claim the protection of s. 502 (1) of the Merchants Shipping Act, 1894, which protects the owner of a British sea-going ship from liability for loss happening "without his actual fault or privity," "by reason of fire on board the ship." The plaintiffs also claimed that the damage to their goods was principally caused by smoke and water used to extinguish the fire, and that this was not damage "by reason of fire" within the statute; but Deane, J., held that the defendant was entitled to the statutory protection, because the stove was perfectly safe if properly used, and therefore the vessel was seaworthy, and the defendant was not actually concerned in or "privity" to the negligence of the crew, and that the injury caused by smoke and water was occasioned by reason of fire within the statute.

CHARITABLE BEQUEST—BEQUEST FOR BELL-RINGING—ERECTION OF TOMBSTONES FOR PENSIONERS—"PUBLIC CHARITIES AND INSTITUTIONS OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES FOR THE PUBLIC ADVANTAGE" TO BE SELECTED BY TRUSTEES—UNCERTAINTY—(R.S.O. c. 333, s. 6).

*In re Pardoe, McLaughlin v. Attorney-General* (1906) 2 Ch. 184. A testatrix bequeathed (1) £200 to the vicar and wardens of a church, the income to be distributed annually at Christmas, as to £1 to the ringers of the church who should ring a peal of bells on the anniversary of the restoration of the monarchy; (2) £700 to the vicar and wardens of a church, the income to be applied inter alia in erecting tombstones to pensioners who should die in a certain almshouse and be buried in the churchyard; (3) and she bequeathed her residuary real and personal estate to trustees in trust to pay and distribute the same among "such public charities and institutions, or for such charitable purposes for the public advantage" as the trustees should think fit. All of these were held by Kekewich, J., to be valid charitable bequests.

COMPANY—GENERAL MEETING—POWER OF DIRECTORS TO POSTPONE GENERAL MEETING.

*In Smith v. Paranga Mines* (1906) 2 Ch. 193 the simple point determined by Kekewich, J., is that the directors of a joint stock