

Soviet Union. The major achievement reflected in the draft treaty is prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean-floor. We warmly welcomed this bilateral self-denying agreement by the two great nuclear powers on the most important requirements for a seabed arms-control treaty. In other respects, however, the draft treaty falls short of our expectations and those of many other countries.

In the Disarmament Committee, Canada advanced a group of interrelated suggestions for disarmament of the seabed. In summary, these suggestions involved:

- (1) The prohibition not only of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, but also of conventional weapons and military installations which could be used for offensive purposes, without, however, banning installations required for self-defence;
- (2) the establishment, beyond the 12-mile coastal band, of a 200-mile security zone to which the proposed arms prohibitions would apply in full but where the coastal state could undertake defensive activities;
- (3) the elaboration of effective verification and inspection procedures to assure compliance with the terms of the treaty, together with an international arrangement making such verification possible for countries with a less developed underwater technology.

With the exception of the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, these Canadian suggestions are not reflected in the draft treaty put forward by the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The co-chairmen's draft does recognize the existing right of states to observe the seabed activities of other states and it does incorporate an undertaking to consult and co-operate in removing doubts concerning compliance with the treaty. It does not, however, provide for the right of inspection and access on the model of either the 1959 Antarctic Treaty or the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Non-nuclear coastal states like Canada wish to be sure that there is nothing on the seabed which could threaten their security and that even permissible defensive activities on the continental shelf are limited to the coastal state concerned.

The provision in the draft treaty limiting the prohibition to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction only in our view intensifies the need for the recognition of a broad coastal-state security zone. Demilitarization of the broadest possible area of the seabed would make such a zone much less necessary, since no state would then have any right to make any military use of the continental shelf. With only nuclear and mass-destruction weapons prohibited, the possibility arises that states may attempt to emplace conventional weapons or military installations on the continental shelf of another state. Obviously, no coastal state could accept with equanimity the emplacement of offensive installations near its shores. If any state has the right to make any military use of the continental shelf, even for defensive purposes, it is the coastal state and the coastal state only. The exclusive