

the Party's main theoretical journal, A.A. Gromyko finds it appropriate to quote Lenin's statement of 1922 that "Genoa is now the most burning question of policy."² A one-to-one equivalence between Genoa in 1922 and Helsinki in 1973 is of course to be avoided. Nevertheless an understanding of the Kremlin's behaviour on the occasion of its first appearance at a multilateral European negotiation may help us to decode current internal Soviet communications about policy toward the CSCE. It may sensitize us to the possibility of inner movement in Soviet conduct on European matters, which otherwise could go unnoticed. And it may tell us something about Soviet tactics at Helsinki. In a word, Genoa provides an opportunity to penetrate the veil that surrounds current Soviet thinking about policy in Europe.

In what follows I intend to consider the principal opposing trends in postwar Soviet conduct toward the West in Europe, and to define nuanced changes in the Soviet approach to the question of a CSCE since 1966 in terms of shifts in the relative influence of these underlying tendencies. It will be suggested that Soviet policies are internally contradictory, consisting principally of two trends, neo-Stalinist and reform, whose role in the totality of Soviet behaviour varies under the pressure of changing situational factors. In order to gain insight into the reform trend as it might be manifested at the CSCE, attention will be given first to

*Tendency?
Sov leaders to
use such
precedents
even -
jointly*