

your price?" The East has already indicated that its counter demands will not be like-for-like, but rather Western reductions of aircraft and helicopters and perhaps other systems as well in exchange for Eastern tanks and guns.

To be sure, NATO must clarify its own thinking about its own forces when formulating its proposal because precedents of quality and quantity will immediately be set. For example, if drastic changes are proposed for Eastern forces then drastic proposals can be expected in return. But NATO does not need to develop quotas and rules for reductions and limitation of its own forces at the beginning: these can come later as the negotiation becomes concrete and detailed.

This does not mean, however, that the West should walk into the negotiating room with nothing further to say. That would be tactically foolish in the negotiating dynamic. A general debate extending over several weeks would probably be useful for all concerned and NATO participants should table position papers relevant to the tasks that lie ahead outlining their preoccupations. A very early paper should explain the West's negotiating concept with particular emphasis on the need to ensure the avoidance of another data deadlock. Having set out their proposals for Eastern limitations and their concept of the negotiation -- a largely political paper -- NATO delegations should then table position papers on the nature of reductions and limitations they could envisage for their own forces. The NATO position described in those papers should include:

- a) Transportability of withdrawn armaments. As discussed earlier, a description of air transportable armaments that could be removed and surface only items that could not. Because the latter includes weapons central to the negotiations such as