

development relationship. It was recommended that the subject be dealt with broadly throughout the government, involving all relevant departments and agencies eg. CIDA, IDRC.

It was suggested that Canada consider launching something along the lines of the "30% Club" on environmental emissions -- ie. a club of donor and recipient nations in which a specific percentage increase or decrease in military spending by developing countries would result in a similar increase or decrease in development assistance.

It was also suggested that Canada broaden the concept of "conditionality" in ODA, from simply linking it to human rights to include the factor of military expenditure.

There was a fairly detailed discussion of Canadian defence policy -- particularly in the NORAD and NATO context. It was believed that Canada need only to assure the U.S. that it was capable of denying Canadian airspace and territory to any would-be aggressor -- this was the full extent of Canada's fundamental obligation to the U.S. It was suggested that Canada could distance itself from U.S. policies whilst continuing to be a good friend and ally.

There was deep concern expressed about recent changes in U.S. doctrinal thinking which was seen to reflect a new militarism in both strategic thinking and operational doctrine. The U.S. was seen to be pursuing decisive counter-force nuclear superiority with an emphasis on first-strike weaponry. This was coupled with an apparent unwillingness to pursue arms control in any vigorous manner. Working within the realistic abilities of Canada to moderate and constrain these policies, it was suggested that Canada reinvigorate its role in NATO by increasing its conventional commitment in terms of weapons and personnel in Europe. Canada could, in this way make its voice credible and audible in vigorously pushing for "no first use" and "no early first use" of nuclear weapons by NATO.

The North Warning System was seen as giving some cause of concern. Whilst the need to upgrade the radar system was recognised, it was suggested that NWS could set a precedent for moving defence combat zones into northern Canada. It was further suggested that, if arms control negotiations yielded nothing in the next five years, Canada might well be asked by the U.S. to participate in some sort of Arctic/Northern-layered defence. In this way it was posited that Canada was, through its involvement in NORAD and NWS, on the "slippery slope" to SDI.