

unison with his character. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter; the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination. And the result, both in the general war and final struggle, was in entire conformity with this distinction; Wellington retired in the outset before the fierce assault of the French legions, but he saw them, for the first time since the Revolution, recoil in defeat from the rocks of Torres Vedras; he was at first repeatedly expelled from Spain, but at last he drove the invaders with disgrace across the Pyrenees; he was in the beginning surprised, and well nigh overpowered in Flanders, but in the end he baffled all Napoleon's efforts, and, rising up with the strength of a giant, crushed at once his army and his empire on the field of Waterloo.

The personal and moral character of the two chiefs was still more strikingly opposed, and characteristic of the sides they severally led. Both were distinguished by the unwearied perseverance, the steady purpose, the magnanimous soul, which are essential to glorious achievements; both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution; both possessed personal intrepidity in the highest degree; both were indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution; both enjoyed the rarer qualities of moral courage and fearless determination. But, in other respects, their minds were as opposite as the poles are asunder. Napoleon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty; Napoleon was reckless of slaughter, Wellington was sparing of blood; Napoleon was careless of his word, Wellington was inviolate in faith. Treaties were regarded by the former as binding only when expedient—*alliances only valid when useful*; obligations were regarded by the latter as obligatory, though ruinous; conventions sacred, even when open to objection. Napoleon's warring warfare converted allies into enemies; Wellington's protecting discipline changed enemies into friends; the former fell, because all Europe rose up against his oppression; the latter triumphed, because all Europe joined to share in his protection. There is not a proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers, in which glory is not mentioned, and duty forgotten; there is not an order of Wellington to his troops, in which duty is not inculcated, nor one in which glory is alluded to. Singleness of heart was the great characteristic of the British hero, a sense of duty his ruling principle; falsehood prevailed the French conquerer, the thirst for glory was his invariable motive. The former proceeded on the belief that the means, if justifiable, would finally work out the end; the latter, on the maxim that the end would in every case justify the means. Napoleon placed himself at the head of Europe, and desolated it for fifteen years with his warfare: Europe placed Wellington at the head of its armies, and he gave it thirty years of unbroken peace. The one exhibited the most shining example of splendid talents devoted to temporal ambition; the other, the noblest instance of moral influence directed to exalted purposes. The former was in the end led to ruin, while blindly following the phantom of worldly greatness; the latter was unambitiously conducted to final greatness, while only following the star of public duty. The struggle between them was the same at bottom as that which, anterior to the creation of man, shook the powers of heaven; and never was such an example of moral government afforded as the final result of their immortal contest.

In this volume we have a rapid but vigorous sketch of the American war of 1812-13-14, with its various achievements and reverses, written in a thoroughly impartial strain, and shewing how well the enemy were met and repelled by the unflinching courage of the gallant yeomanry of Canada, when Britain could not spare from the Continental contest the bayonets of her invincible troops. From the Americans, however, Alison has withheld no praise where by their energy in prosperous, or their constancy in adverse, fortune, they had won it, nor does he conceal the many and grievous errors committed by the leaders of the British Armies, which unnecessarily protracted the contest, and rendered it, at its termination, less decisive than it would have been had a more vigorous plan of pursuing the contest been adopted and followed up.

The limits to which we must confine ourselves forbid us from extracting as largely as we could wish from this most interesting volume, which contains many passages which might be detached easily from the book, and yet retain their interest. We cannot, however, resist the temptation to extract the following reflections upon the consequences of the war:

Perhaps no nation ever suffered so severely as the Americans did from this war, in their external and commercial relations. Their foreign trade, anterior to the estrangement from Great Britain, so flourishing as to amount to £22,000,000 of exports, and £28,000,000 of imports, carried on in 1,300,000 tons of shipping, was, literally speaking, and by no figure of speech, *annihilated*; for the official returns show that the former had sunk in 1814 to £1,400,000, or little more than an eighteenth part of their former amount, the latter to less than three millions. The capture of no less than fourteen hundred American vessels of war and merchandize, appeared in the London Gazette during the two years and a half of its continuance, besides probably an equal number which were too inconsiderable to enter that register; and although, no doubt, they retaliated actively and effectively by their ships of war and privateers on British commerce, yet their number was too small to produce any considerable set-off to such immense losses; and the rapid growth of British commerce, when placed in juxtaposition to the almost total extinction of that of the United States, demonstrates decisively, that while the contest lasted the sinews of war were increasing in the one country as rapidly as they were drying up in the other. In truth, the ordinary American revenue, almost entirely derived from custom-house duties, nearly vanished during the continuance of the war, and the deficit required to be made up by excise and direct taxes levied in the interior, and loans, in the year 1814 amounted to no less than \$20,500,000, or above £4,000,000 sterling; an immense sum for a state, the annual income of which in ordinary times was only \$23,000,000, or £4,600,-