

Wide World photo

After a series of meetings between Soviet and Egyptian leaders, President Sadat announced in July that the bulk of Soviet military advisers, technicians

o r it s

ı~ ie

ır

s-]-

w nd ng ed w sw sy, in-

ks, 10ial pt.

ds

ect

ni-

gn-

for

icy

011

ı ei

red

ver

le 4

 $\mathbf{e}\mathbf{r}$ s

in

dle

and

d۰

hat

 $f_{i,A}$

R. s

aae of

hde

and

ot a

rot

an e

1:15

rea,

. 00

sian

ottee

lat's

gent,

i ne

West, for help in arriving at the settlement with Israel. Sadat affirmed that there was no Arab-U.S. problem, only an Arab-Israeli one.

But his plea was met with a deafening silence in every Western capital, and even France refused Sadat's suggestion for a visit to Paris to talk things over. The United States seems committed to the *Realpolitik* approach and the view that Israel is the one great bastion against Communist inroads in the region (although it was the creation of Israel that opened the door to the strategic penetration of the Russians into the area). Egypt will thus continue to be dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for weapons and the servicing of its military machine.

Aziz Sidqi, Egypt's Prime Minister, who is far from being a Communist, is reported to have been apprehensive that Badat's action might disturb Egypt's financial and commercial relations with Russia. The Soviet Union is deeply involved in 40 major industrial enterprises in Egypt, and such patterns of development and trade cannot be changed overnight. Egypt signed another \$100-million trade agreement with Russia last June, and in order to meet its obligations to the Eastern bloc, Egypt ships to it perhaps as much as 80 per cent of its annual cotton crop. It is reported from Beirut that the main Russian naval base will be removed from

and instructors were being asked to leave. Pictured are three of the Russians as they pass the Soviet club in the Cairo suburb of Zamalek.

Egypt to the Syrian port of Latakia, though Egypt will continue to provide port facilities for the Russians in exchange for military spare parts.

What, then, has Sadat accomplished by his dramatic move, which was characterized by Edward Sheehan in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 6 as "an act of desperation — a spectacular diversion, a colossal attempt to buy more time, a heroic grasping at straws, a blind groping to find a way out of Egypt's dilemma"? At least, Sadat has let the Russians know that Egypt intends to be master in its own house and that Egypt's interests must come first.

Offer from Libya

Sadat may have no real alternative to Russian help, but he did have one card up his sleeve—he had had an offer from President Qaddafi of Libya for the union of their two countries. The sceptic may be justified in asking whether the marriage will be consummated by the time of the announced wedding date of September 1. 1973. Again, as in the case of Egypt's union with Syria, it is the smaller partner that is urging the union, and Libya has an attractive dowry to offer. Various loose federal unions between Egypt and other Arab states have been announced since the breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961 — with Syria and Iraq in 1963, with Libya and the Sudan in 1969, and with