

NOTES AND ADDENDUM.

Note A, page 219.

HUME's "Argument on Miracles" is to the effect that, while it is contrary to universal and uniform experience that a miracle should occur, it is quite in accordance with experience that testimony (on which alone we must depend for proof of any alleged miraculous fact) should be false; and that, therefore, no testimony can have such force as to prove the occurrence of a miracle. Hume admits that "there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony," and supposes an instance, while he thinks no such instance can be found in the records of history. But he contends that his argument applies with full force against a miracle in connection with any system of religion. In any such case, he says, a reported miracle is not only to be rejected, but to be rejected "without examination" of any testimony by which it may be supported.

However plausible this argument may appear, it would be difficult to find in any writer of name so large an amount of fallacy compressed into so small a space.

It is to be noted in general: 1. That, if the argument is sound, it must apply *universally*, and not be limited to miracles in connection with religion. If any discrimination is to be made, it must be not *against*, but in *favour of*, a miracle that may be designed to authenticate a divine revelation;