

Professor Benedikt's conclusions are those of a thorough-going somatist, who would bring all human conduct within the range of organic action. "The constitutional criminal," he says, "is a burdened individual, and has the same relation to crime as his next of blood kin, the epileptic, and his cousin, the idiot, have to their encephalopathic conditions." And again, "the essential ground of abnormal action of the brain" (*i.e.*, I take it, bad conduct.) "is abnormal brain structure. His 44 criminals were what they were because of defects in the organization of their hemispheres: they belonged to the *criminal variety* of the *genus homo*. No wonder he says "that this proposition is likely to create a veritable revolution in ethics, psychology, jurisprudence and criminalities." He wisely adds that it should not yet serve as a premise, and should not, for the present, leave the hands of the anatomists, since it must be repeatedly proven before it can finally rank as an undoubted addition to human science.

Crime is commonly regarded as the result of yielding to an evil impulse which could have been controlled; and this element of *possible control* is what, in the eyes of the law, separates the responsible criminal from the irresponsible lunatic. The belief in a criminal *psychosis* is spreading, and is the outcome of sounder views of the relation of mind to brain; and these investigations of Prof. Benedikt, to which I have so frequently referred, may serve as a foundation to a natural history of crime. But if this *is* the case, how are we to regard our criminals? What degree of responsibility can be attached to the actions of a man with a defective cerebral organization? Where is there scope to eschew the evil and to do the good, when men are "villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance." Any one who believes that with all our mental and moral processes there is an unbroken material succession, must consistently be a *determinist*, and hold, with Spinoza, that "in the mind there is no such thing as absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another cause, this by yet another, and so on to infinity." For a long time to come, how-