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sentence of excommunication may be pronounced at once, without more. It is probable also that in such a case the consequences of the sentence, when pronounced, would have reference back to the heretical, or other act, on which the sentence is based; much in the same manner as an adjudication of a bankrupt relates back to the act of bankruptcy, and does not count for all purposes, from the date of the adjudication only. Here there is no definite act of bankruptcy even alleged. But sentence of excommunication be pronounced. It must be pronounced by acclamation, and after a trial at least conformable with natural justice, upon proof, and after summoning the accused. And sentence of excommunication may be followed no doubt in the case of a Bishop by sentence of suspension or deprivation, or such other sentence as a court of competent jurisdiction may think fit to pronounce, if any. But that too must be by a court of competent jurisdiction, after a trial consistent with natural justice and so on. It would be a poor jest to ask if any such investigation or sentence has taken place. But what is, perhaps, not uninteresting to remark, is the extraordinary incapacity of even the most conscientious man to act towards others on the golden rule of doing as he would be done by. Here is a man who, for offences really open, glaring, not denied, but gloried in, offences against canon law, against statute law, against common sense and ordinary good manners, against the utmost lenity and forbearance shown towards him, is at last cited, before a self-organized tribunal, not a court of course in any legal sense, or with any legal powers, but as good a tribunal as could be formed in the diocese—clearly as respectable a tribunal as any Chamber of Commerce or Board of Surveyors—and after weeks of notice, and days of trial in his presence, is at last found, by that so-called "Court or Board of Inquiry" to have committed acts which, as I have said, be never denied, and openly glories in; and yet for weeks the whole city has been disturbed by the vociferous clamours of his partisans—I will not say of himself, for I believe he is but the instrument of others—against the illegality, the injustice, the monstrous nature of the tribunal, and the finding and the sentence; and at least if the defendant does not openly join in these clamours, he utters no word to brand them as unfounded and slanderous. Nay, his counsel here argues most temperately and discreetly I admit, but still vigorously, on the same side, namely, that the sentence against the defendant was inconsistent with natural justice. And yet this same man thinks it consistent with natural justice, and that he is dispensing to others the same measure of justice, wherewith he seeks to have judged himself, that the Bishop should be held to have lost his whole position without any trial, by the sentence of no court or any tribunal resembling a court, without notice, without summons, without being even put on his defence, by a mere oral suggestion of counsel. Surely the old proverb of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel never received so exaggerated an illustration!

The position and status of the plaintiff here seems to be much misunderstood. The fact is that the Lord Bishop of British Columbia holds his jurisdiction, his powers, and his authority so far as it can be derived from any temporal authority, from the same Royal and Supreme Source of all authority in the British Dominions, by an instrument as solemn as I hold my own Commission and derived directly from the Crown under Her Majesty's Sign Manual. It is true the powers so given require to be supplemented, some of them by the authority of an Imperial or local Act of Parliament. My own commission is sanctioned by both, and that being the method by which Her Majesty can constitutionally give coercive jurisdiction, coercive jurisdiction is placed in the hands of myself and the different judges in the various Supreme Courts throughout the British Dominions. Now the plaintiff's Letters Patent assume to give him full jurisdiction, and they would probably have at once given him such jurisdiction if his diocese had been in a Crown Colony,—though I rather doubt this—but the terms are certainly ample to give him full jurisdiction, and would do so if the Letters were based on, or confirmed by, an Act of Parliament. Possibly if a local Act were

passed here, recognizing or confirming the Letters Patent, the Bishop would have full coercive jurisdiction as from that time. I am far from saying that this is probable or even desirable. I think that such jurisdiction is much more safely and beneficially for all parties, placed in the hands of this Court. Not that I have the smallest opinion that my judgment is superior to that of the plaintiff, on the contrary, I wish to be understood as placing very little confidence in my own judgment. But I have the greatest confidence in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and as long as the plaintiff's sentences have to come to this Court to be enforced, I and all the church here, and in fact all denominations and religions have the advantage of the appeal to the Privy Council, which otherwise would not lie, but there would be only an appeal from the plaintiff to the Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being. Now placing as I do, great confidence in the wisdom and learning of that great prelate and of those who may succeed him, I must say that I nevertheless feel very much more confidence in the wisdom, in the learning, and above all in the coherency and consistency of the Judicial Committee, than in the decisions of a series of Archbishops of whatever see. Then besides the secular jurisdiction thus imperfectly bestowed, the plaintiff has his spiritual authority derived from the imposition of hands, which, though vague, and I conceive, left by our church, purposely indefinite, can never be treated by any churchman as less solemn on that account, but rather as all the more impressive. He is sent out here by all the authority of the Crown and of our church not to be taught, but to teach orthodoxy, not to be reviled, but to reprove error, and to receive all due obedience from the members of the Church of England here.

The Bishop till he be duly deposed or deprived will be considered as a Bishop exactly in the same way as a licensed clergyman until his license is duly revoked, is to be considered a licensed clergyman still, whatever his offence. I should wish Mr. Robertson to try and find out how loudly his client would have protested if the Bishop had said nothing for the last two years; or Pandora street trial had taken place but,—Mr. McCreight had suggested yesterday for the first time, "Oh! if the defendant appears to us to have committed an offence on the 5th of December, 1874, for which the statute says the Bishop should suspend him. It is true we have never mentioned the matter since then, but we now submit that he must be considered as having been suspended as from that date." Yet this is really less than the measure wherewith he seeks to mete out justice to his antagonist.

An obvious comparison may serve to explain the matter to the non-ecclesiastical mind. Suppose a trader, as many traders do, to have committed an act of bankruptcy upon which no steps were taken and after a lapse of time a customer were to say, "I shall not pay you for those goods I have received from you, you are an uncertificated bankrupt." I apprehend the reply would be in a tone of indignant surprise. "It is true some time ago I committed or suffered such an act, which would have empowered a Court of competent jurisdiction, if they had thought fit after summoning me and hearing the whole case, to have adjudged me a bankrupt. But who are you? and what right have you to take upon yourself to say what decision the court might have come to? Now I shall make you pay even to the uttermost farthing." This I say would probably be the language between men of business. And how much stronger would the case be, if the trader could conscientiously deny that he ever had committed an act of bankruptcy at all, and that the act of bankruptcy existed only in the imagination of the man who was on this pretence endeavoring to escape from a very clear obligation; whatever reputation for conscientiousness the customer may have claimed for himself, I am afraid the trader and the world generally would place it at a very low standard.

This contention, however, by the defendant's counsel, that the plaintiff is not in fact a Bishop of the Church of England at all makes it impossible for me to take any longer the favorable construction which I felt disposed to place yesterday on his statement in the letter of the